Malebranche and Descartes on Method: Psychologism, Free Will, and Doubt

Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (4):581-604 (2008)

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Abstract
The subject of this paper is Malebranche’s relation to Descartes on the question of method. Using recent commentary as a springboard, it examines whether Malebranche advances a nonpsychologistic account of method, in contrast to the psychologism typically thought to characterize the Cartesian view. I explore this question with respect to two issues of central importance to method generally: doubt and free will. My argument is that, despite superficial differences of emphasis, Descartes and Malebranche adopt positions on doubt and free will that effectively ensure that their respective accounts of method aresubstantially the same
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2008.tb00086.x
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Malebranche.Andrew Pyle - 2003 - Routledge.

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