Consciousness, the brain and the connection principle: A reply

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):217-232 (1995)
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John R. Searle
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

Causal Explanation in Psychiatry.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - In Şerife Tekin & Robyn Bluhm (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. London: Bloomsbury.
Mental Causation and Searle’s Impossible Conception of Unconscious Intentionality.Anthonie W. M. Meijers - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):155-170.
É o naturalismo biológico uma concepção fisicalista?Tárik de Athayde Prata - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (2):255-276.

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