When Normal and Extensive Form Decisions Differ

In Dag Prawitz, Brian Skyrms & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, methodology, and philosophy of science IX: proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Uppsala, Sweden, August 7-14, 1991. New York: Elsevier. pp. 451-463 (1994)
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Abstract

The "traditional" view of normative decision theory, as reported (for example) in chapter 2 of Luce and RaiÃa's [1957] classic work, Games and Decisions, proposes a reduction of sequential decisions problems to non-sequential decisions: a reduction of extensive forms to normal forms. Nonetheless, this reduction is not without its critics, both from inside and outside expected utility theory, It islay purpose in this essay to join with those critics by advocating the following thesis.

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Teddy Seidenfeld
Carnegie Mellon University

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