Synthese 68 (2):369-382 (1986)

David Shatz
Yeshiva University
This paper is a reply to James Keller 's criticisms of my Foundationalism, Coherentism and the Levels Gambit.Foundationalists have often claimed that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles in a mediate, empirical fashion, while escaping the charge of vicious circularity that is usually thought to afflict such methods of justification. In my original paper I attacked this foundationalist strategy; I argued that once mediate, empirical justification of epistemic principles is allowed, the foundationalist must also allow circular patterns of justification of the sort that he typically criticizes coherentists for espousing. Here I argue that Keller 's reply only makes matters worse for the foundationalist. At several points, his reply turns out to be inconsistent either with reliabilism or with the foundationalist strategy he is trying to defend
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413838
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References found in this work BETA

Deciding to Believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.

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Reliabilism and Induction.Michael Levin - 1993 - Synthese 97 (3):297 - 334.

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