Philosophical Studies 139 (2):289-306 (2008)

Authors
Assaf Sharon
Stanford University
Levi Spectre
Open University of Israel
Abstract
Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the principle should be rejected. We analyze Williamson's argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against. After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9119-7
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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