Difference, incommensurability, decision
Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to discuss how the possibility of understanding difference relates to political decision making. We will see , using Althusser, it is possible to establish and maintain difference without those differences becoming incommensurable; that it is possible to understand the differences of others. We‟ll then see that this ability is of little use when it comes time to act, for example, making a decision; that many differences are excluded from the process of decision making in the public sphere. In Section II. this outcome is compared with the liberal democratic principle of toleration and found to be in conflict with it. However, we will then discover that although such decisions are „intolerant‟ and exclude, this does not seem to illigitimise, or make them intolerable, since the principle of tolerance is, as will be demonstrated, a vacuous principle. Following this, in Section III., we investigate how decisions could be legitimate and find it is merely "a moment of sheer power" and "willing" that legitimised them. We will compare this outcome with current traditional values, deciding we may still maintain them. In conclusion it is claimed that future democracies should be more pragmatic and deliberative