Undecidability in anti-realism

Philosophia Mathematica 6 (3):324-333 (1998)
In this paper I attempt to clarify a relatively little-studied aspect of Michael Dummett's argument for intuitionism: its use of the notion of ‘undecidable’ sentence. I give a new analysis of this concept in epistemic terms, with which I resolve some puzzles and questions about how it works in the anti-realist critique of classical logic.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/6.3.324
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