Philosophia Mathematica 6 (3):324-333 (1998)

Sanford Shieh
Wesleyan University
In this paper I attempt to clarify a relatively little-studied aspect of Michael Dummett's argument for intuitionism: its use of the notion of ‘undecidable’ sentence. I give a new analysis of this concept in epistemic terms, with which I resolve some puzzles and questions about how it works in the anti-realist critique of classical logic.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/6.3.324
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1980 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 170 (1):62-65.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1981 - Philosophical Quarterly 31 (122):47-67.

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Radical Anti-Realism and Substructural Logics.Jacques Dubucs & Mathieu Marion - 2003 - In A. Rojszczak, J. Cachro & G. Kurczewski (eds.), Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 235--249.

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