Indiscriminability and the phenomenal

Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):91-112 (2004)
Abstract
In this paper, I describe and criticize M.G.F. Martin's version of disjunctivism, and his argument for it from premises about self-knowledge.
Keywords Discrimination  Disjunction  Kind  Metaphysics  Perception  Phenomena  Martin, M
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DOI 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000033752.70521.13
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Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
The Openness of Illusions.Louise Antony - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):25-44.
Good News for the Disjunctivist About the Bad Cases.Heather Logue - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua.Diana Raffman - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):309-322.

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