Epistemological Disjunctivism and Introspective Indiscriminability

Philosophia 47 (1):183-205 (2019)
Authors
Christopher Ranalli
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
According to Duncan Pritchard’s version of epistemological disjunctivism, in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge, one’s knowledge that p is grounded in one’s seeing that p, and one can, by reflection alone, come to know that they see that p. In this paper, I argue that the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability is incompatible with epistemological disjunctivism, so understood. This has the consequence that theories of the nature of sensory experience which accept the epistemic conception of introspective indiscriminability—such as phenomenal character disjunctivism and certain forms of naïve realism—are inconsistent with epistemological disjunctivism, so understood. I then argue that proponents of epistemological disjunctivism face a formidable challenge explaining in what sense, if any, one can have purely reflective knowledge of their factive rational support.
Keywords Epistemological Disjunctivism  Metaphysical Disjunctivism  Introspective Indiscriminability  Seeing that P  Naive Realism
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-018-9969-6
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References found in this work BETA

The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
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Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):70-90.
The Possibility of Knowledge.Quassim Cassam - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):125-141.

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