Neutral versus Relative: A Reply to Broome, and McNaughton and Rawling: John Skorupski

Utilitas 8 (2):235-248 (1996)
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John Skorupski
University of St. Andrews
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820800004891
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Distinguishing Agent-Relativity From Agent-Neutrality.Matthew Hammerton - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.

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