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  1.  61
    Can There Be Government House Reasons for Action?Hille Paakkunainen - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):56-93.
    I defend the relatively orthodox view that reasons for action are premises in good practical reasoning, against recent counterexamples that suggest that, like “government house” moral justifications, some reasons are to be ignored in deliberation. I also explain, positively, what is right about the orthodoxy. Unless reasons are premises in good practical reasoning, reasons cannot be normative in the way they are usually taken to be, and relatedly, are unfit to play certain familiar theoretical and related everyday roles that give (...)
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  2. The “Just Too Different” Objection to Normative Naturalism.Hille Paakkunainen - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (2):e12473.
    Consider normative properties and facts, such as facts consisting in something's being what you ought to do, or the property of being morally wrong. Normative naturalism is the view that normative properties and facts such as these exist, and that they are natural properties and facts. Some suspect, however, that normativity is incompatible with a wholly naturalistic worldview: that the normative couldn't be natural because it's somehow “just too different” from the natural. I critically examine recent forms of this “just (...)
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  3.  83
    Doing Away with the “Shmagency” Objection to Constitutivism.Hille Paakkunainen - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):431-480.
    Constitutivists attempt to ground reasons for action in the constitutive features of agency. Central to Enoch's famous “shmagency” objection to constitutivism is the idea that constitutivists should worry about the question whether there is reason to be an agent rather than a “shmagent”-where a shmagent is a non-agent being who lacks the constitutive features of agency, but is otherwise as similar to agents as can be. I explain why constitutivism isn’t in trouble even if there’s no reason to be an (...)
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  4. Normativity and Agency.Hille Paakkunainen - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 402-416.
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  5.  98
    Internal Reasons: Contemporary Readings.Kieran Setiya & Hille Paakkunainen (eds.) - 2011 - MIT Press.
    Some of the most challenging questions in philosophical ethics concern the justification of action. Can you have reasons to do something that you are not, and perhaps cannot be, motivated to do? If reasons rest on desires, why respect the rights and interests of others when doing so prevents us from getting what we want? In other words, why be moral? In his 1979 essay, "Internal and External Reasons," Bernard Williams framed the dispute about reason and motivation in a way (...)
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  6.  29
    Ralph Wedgwood: The Value of Rationality.Hille Paakkunainen - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (9):509-514.
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  7.  39
    John Skorupski, The Domain of Reasons , Pp. Xxii + 525.Hille Paakkunainen - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (4):480-483.
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  8.  6
    Vindicating Practical Norms: Metasemantic Strategies.Hille Paakkunainen - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9.
    Some ways of updating belief have more epistemic merit than others. Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke have defended varieties of the view that the epistemic merit of certain ways of updating belief is explained by facts about the conditions of possessing certain concepts. In particular, they argue that if it is a condition of possessing a concept C that one must be disposed to update one’s beliefs in accord with a norm N, then beliefs updated in accord with N are (...)
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  9.  14
    Shafer-Landau, Russ, Ed. Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 7.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 371. $110.00 ; $45.00. [REVIEW]Hille Paakkunainen - 2013 - Ethics 123 (4):784-789.
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  10.  1
    Rationality and Supervenience: A Comment on Broome.Hille Paakkunainen - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):321-331.
    ABSTRACT Broome criticizes reasons-responsiveness conceptions of rationality by arguing that while rationality supervenes on non-factive mental states, reasons-responsiveness in the relevant sense does not. I give a limited defence of reasons-responsiveness conceptions of rationality against Broome’s criticisms. I argue that Broome fails to show that reasons-responsiveness conceptions of rationality are barred from regarding non-factive mental duplicates as equally rational in the sorts of ‘New Evil Demon’ scenarios that tend to motivate the intuition that rationality supervenes on non-factive mental states. Still, (...)
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