Philosophia 32 (1-4):241-251 (2005)

Edward Slowik
Winona State University
This paper contends that some of the recent critical appraisals of universals theories of natural laws, namely, van Fraassen's analysis of Armstrong's probabilistic laws, are largely ineffective since they fail to disclose the incompatibility of universals and any realistic natural law setting. Rather, a more profitable line of criticism is developed that contests the universalists' claim to have resolved the induction problem (i.e., the separation of natural laws from mere accidental regularities), and thereby reveals the universals' philosophically inadequate concept of a physical property.
Keywords laws of nature  universals  induction
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Reprint years 2007
DOI 10.1007/BF02641622
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References found in this work BETA

What is a Law of Nature?D. M. Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
What is a Law of Nature?Mark Wilson - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):435-441.
Renewing Philosophy.Hilary Putnam - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Words and Life.Hilary Putnam - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
Words and Life.Hilary Putnam & James Conant - 1994 - Philosophy 70 (273):460-463.

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