Kant’s “I think” and the agential approach to self-knowledge

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):980-1011 (2019)
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Abstract

ABSTRACTThis paper relates Kant’s account of pure apperception to the agential approach to self-knowledge. It argues that his famous claim ‘The I think must be able to accompany all of my represent...

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Houston Smit
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104.
Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):661-686.
Kant on Reason as the Capacity for Comprehension.Karl Schafer - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):844-862.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Content preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2010 - New York: Routledge.

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