A preference for selfish preferences: The problem of motivations in rational choice political science
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (3):361-378 (2008)
This article analyzes the problem of preference imputation in rational choice political science. I argue against the well-established practice in political science of assuming selfish preferences for purely methodological reasons, regardless of its empirical plausibility (this I call a preference for selfish preferences). Real motivations are overlooked due to difficulties of imputing preferences to agents in a non-arbitrary way in the political realm. I compare the problem of preference imputation in economic and political markets, and I show the harmful consequences of the preference for selfish preferences in the field of collective action. Key Words: rational choice theory preference functionalism collective action.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Why Rational Agents Should Not Be Liberal Maximizers.Isaac Levi - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):1-17.
Collective Preferences, Obligations, and Rational Choice.Margaret P. Gilbert - 2001 - Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):109-119.
Accounting for Political Preferences: Cultural Theory Vs. Cultural History.Jeffrey Friedman - 1991 - Critical Review 5 (3):325-351.
Decision Theoretic Foundations for Axioms of Rational Preference.Sven Ove Hansson - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):401 - 412.
In Defense of Adaptive Preferences.Donald W. Bruckner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):307 - 324.
A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2011 - Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2):145-164.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads24 ( #202,462 of 2,143,899 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #387,257 of 2,143,899 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.