Alternative motivation: A new challenge to moral judgment internalism

Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):41 – 53 (2009)
Abstract
Internalists argue that there is a necessary connection between motivation and moral judgment. The examination of cases plays an important role in philosophical debate about internalism. This debate has focused on cases concerning the failure to act in accordance with a moral judgment, for one reason or another. I call these failure cases . I argue that a different sort of case is also relevant to this debate. This sort of case is characterized by (1) moral judgment and (2) behavior that accords with the content of the moral judgment but that has been performed not because of the moral judgment. Instead it is due to some other source of motivation. I call these alternative motivation cases . I distinguish two sorts of alternative motivation cases, and I argue that externalists have natural explanations of these cases. By contrast, extant internalist accounts of failure cases are inadequate when applied to alternative motivation cases
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/13869790802638667
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,349
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Blackwell.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
Svavarsdóttir's Burden.Olinder Ragnar Francén - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):577-589.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Expressivism and Dispositional Desires.Caj Strandberg - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):81-91.
Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation.James Dreier - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):619-638.
Moral Motivation Pluralism.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.
Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism About Moral Judgements.van Roojen Mark - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):26-49.
Moral Motivation and Christian Theism.Ryan Nichols - 2004 - Faith and Philosophy 21 (2):175-194.
What’s Wrong with Morality?C. Daniel Batson - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):230-236.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
61 ( #88,543 of 2,193,595 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #290,647 of 2,193,595 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature