Scepticism about intuition

Philosophy 81 (4):633-648 (2006)
Contemporary philosophy’s antipathy to intuition can come to seem baffling. There is inadequate reason to move away from the intuitively attractive view that we have a faculty of intuition, in many ways akin to our faculties of perception and memory and introspection, that gives us reason for belief, and with it, often enough, gives us knowledge. The purpose here is to consider whether scepticism about intuition is more reasonable than a corresponding scepticism about other epistemic faculties. I am sceptical that it is
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0031819106318050
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,433
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
John Bengson (2013). Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
Jennifer Nado (2014). Why Intuition? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):15-41.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

158 ( #26,925 of 1,925,039 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #212,000 of 1,925,039 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.