Episteme 9 (4):311-328 (2012)
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Abstract |
Many philosophers accept a view – what I will call the intuition picture – according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgements relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that: it is consistent with a wide range of views about not only philosophical evidence but also the nature of evidence in general, including Williamson's famous view that E = K; it can maintain the central claims about the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy made by proponents of the intuition picture; it does not collapse into Williamson's own deflationary view of the nature and role of intuitions in philosophy; and it does not lead to scepticism.
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Keywords | Epistemology of Philosophy Intuition Metaphilosophy Evidence Methodology Williamson |
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DOI | 10.1017/epi.2012.21 |
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One Philosopher's Modus Ponens is Another's Modus Tollens: Pantomemes and Nisowir.Jon Williamson - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (2-3):284-304.
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