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  1. Intuition.Frederick Anderson - 1926 - Journal of Philosophy 23 (14):365-377.
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  2. Intuitions.James Andow - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):232-246.
    Intuitions is presented as a counterpart of Rethinking Intuition ( DePaul and Ramsey 1998 ). 1 After 16 years, it revisits the topic of the place of intuitions in philosophy in light of two developments...
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  3. The Nature of Epistemic Feelings.Santiago Arango-Muñoz - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (2):1-19.
    Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called ?epistemic feelings.? This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and (...)
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  4. Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom, Eds., Intuitions. Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Eran Asoulin - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (5):238-240.
  5. Intuition and Its Place in Ethics.Robert Audi - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):57--77.
    ABSTRACT ABSTRACT: This paper provides a multifaceted account of intuition. The paper integrates apparently disparate conceptions of intuition, shows how the notion has figured in epistemology as well as in intuitionistic ethics, and clarifies the relation between the intuitive and the self-evident. Ethical intuitionism is characterized in ways that, in phenomenology, epistemology, and ontology, represent an advance over the position of W. D. Ross while preserving its commonsense normative core and intuitionist character. This requires clarifying the sense in which intuitions (...)
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  6. Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics.Robert Audi - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475-492.
    This paper defends a moderate intuitionism by extending a version of that view previously put forward and responding to some significant objections to it that have been posed in recent years. The notion of intuition is clarified, and various kinds of intuition are distinguished and interconnected. These include doxastic intuitions and intuitive seemings. The concept of inference is also clarified. In that light, the possibility of non-inferential intuitive justification is explained in relation to both singular moral judgments, which intuitionists do (...)
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  7. Review of Lynn Holt, Apprehension: Reason in the Absence of Rules[REVIEW]Guy Axtell - 2003 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (9).
  8. Types of Intuition.Archie J. Bahm - 1961 - Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.
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  9. A Psychological View of Moral Intuition.Jonathan Baron - 1995 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 5 (1):36-40.
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  10. Must Philosopherss Rely On Intuitions?Avner Baz - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (4):316-337.
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  11. The Origins of Modal Error.George Bealer - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility (...)
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  12. Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1998 - In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 201-240.
    The phenomenology of a priori intuition is explored at length (where a priori intuition is taken to be not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual as opposed to sensory seeming). Various reductive accounts of intuition are criticized, and Humean empiricism (which, unlike radical empiricism, does admit analyticity intuitions as evidence) is shown to be epistemically self-defeating. This paper also recapitulates the defense of the thesis of the Autonomy and Authority of Philosophy given in the (...)
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  13. A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
    This paper provides a defense of two traditional theses: the Autonomy of Philosophy and the Authority of Philosophy. The first step is a defense of the evidential status of intuitions (intellectual seemings). Rival views (such as radical empiricism), which reject the evidential status of intuitions, are shown to be epistemically self-defeating. It is then argued that the only way to explain the evidential status of intuitions is to invoke modal reliabilism. This theory requires that intuitions have a certain qualified modal (...)
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  14. Intuition.George Bealer - 1996 - In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement. Macmillan. pp. 262-264.
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  15. Va Savoir! De la Connaissance En Général -- Pascal Engel. [REVIEW]Guillaume Beaulac & Pierre Poirier - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):217-221.
  16. Intuition: Its Nature and Function.Leslie Belton - 1948 - Hibbert Journal 47:166.
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  17. The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.
    Intuition is sometimes derided as an abstruse or esoteric phenomenon akin to crystal-ball gazing. Such derision appears to be fuelled primarily by the suggestion, evidently endorsed by traditional rationalists such as Plato and Descartes, that intuition is a kind of direct, immediate apprehension akin to perception. This paper suggests that although the perceptual analogy has often been dismissed as encouraging a theoretically useless metaphor, a quasi-perceptualist view of intuition may enable rationalists to begin to meet the challenge of supplying a (...)
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  18. From Experience to Metaphysics: On Experience‐Based Intuitions and Their Role in Metaphysics.Jiri Benovsky - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):684-697.
    Metaphysical theories are often counter-intuitive. But they also often are strongly supported and motivated by intuitions. One way or another, the link between intuitions and metaphysics is a strong and important one, and there is hardly any metaphysical discussion where intuitions do not play a crucial role. In this article, I will be interested in a particular kind of such intuitions, namely those that come, at least partly, from experience. There seems to be a route from experience to metaphysics, and (...)
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  19. Philosophy Without Intuitions? A Reply to Cappelen.Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):368-381.
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  20. Virtuous Intuitions: Comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa’s A Virtue Epistemology.Paul Boghossian - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):111-119.
    I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis of understanding it. However, I don't think it is constitutive of them that they supply strictly foundational justification for the propositions they justify, though I do believe that it is important that the intuition of a suitable subject be thought of as a prima facie justification for his intuitive judgment, independently of the reliability of his underlying capacities. I also (...)
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  21. Elijah Chudnoff, Intuition. [REVIEW]Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (2):59-62.
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  22. Michael DePaul and William Ramsey (Eds) Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. [REVIEW]Laurence BonJour - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):151-158.
  23. The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions.Kenneth Boyd & Jennifer Nagel - 2014 - In Edouard Machery & O'Neill Elizabeth (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 109-127.
  24. Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):382-393.
    In Philosophy Without Intuitions Herman Cappelen argues that unlike what is commonly thought, contemporary analytic philosophers do not typically rely on intuitions as evidence. If they do indeed rely on intuitions, that should be evident from their written works, either explicitly in the form of ‘intuition’ talk or by means of other indicators. However, Cappelen argues, while philosophers do engage in ‘intuition’ talk, that is not a good indicator that they rely on intuitions, as ‘intuition’ and its cognates have many (...)
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  25. Intuition.A. Barratt Brown - 1914 - International Journal of Ethics 24 (3):282-293.
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  26. Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence.Jessica Brown - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):493-516.
    What is the nature of the evidence provided by thought experiments in philosophy? For instance, what evidence is provided by the Gettier thought experiment against the JTB theory of knowledge? According to one view, it provides as evidence only a certain psychological proposition, e.g. that it seems to one that the subject in the Gettier case lacks knowledge. On an alternative, nonpsychological view, the Gettier thought experiment provides as evidence the nonpsychological proposition that the subject in the Gettier case lacks (...)
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  27. Chinese Intuitionism: A Reply to Feigl on Intuition.Carsun Chang - 1960 - Philosophy East and West 10 (1/2):35-49.
  28. In Defense of Intuitions: A New Rationalist Manifesto.Andrew Chapman, Addison Ellis, Robert Hanna, Henry Pickford & Tyler Hildebrand - 2013 - London: Palgrave MacMillan.
    A reply to contemporary skepticism about intuitions and a priori knowledge, and a defense of neo-rationalism from a contemporary Kantian standpoint, focusing on the theory of rational intuitions and on solving the two core problems of justifying and explaining them.
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  29. Awareness of Abstract Objects.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):706-726.
    Awareness is a two-place determinable relation some determinates of which are seeing, hearing, etc. Abstract objects are items such as universals and functions, which contrast with concrete objects such as solids and liquids. It is uncontroversial that we are sometimes aware of concrete objects. In this paper I explore the more controversial topic of awareness of abstract objects. I distinguish two questions. First, the Existence Question: are there any experiences that make their subjects aware of abstract objects? Second, the Grounding (...)
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  30. What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
    What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The (...)
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  31. R. Davis-Floyd and PS Arvidson, Intuition. [REVIEW]G. Claxton - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:124-125.
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  32. Logical Analysis and Cognitive Intuition.Richard Cobb-Stevens - 1988 - Études Phénoménologiques 4 (7):3-32.
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  33. The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy.Daniel Cohnitz & Sören Häggqvist - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):1-14.
    As we write this, philosophers all over the world are in a state of temporary, collective self-scrutiny. Tey are poring over the results of the PhilPapers Survey, conducted by David Chalmers and David Bourgeta grand-scale survey of the professions views on 30 major philosophical issues, ranging from aesthetic value to zombies. More than 3000 people have responded, andmanymore are currently absorbing and analyzing the results.
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  34. Definition of Intuition.William L. Davidson - 1882 - Mind 7 (26):304-310.
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  35. Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From.Helen De Cruz - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249.
    Intuitions play a central role in analytic philosophy, but their psychological basis is little understood. This paper provides an empirically-informed, psychological char- acterization of philosophical intuitions. Drawing on McCauley’s distinction between maturational and practiced naturalness, I argue that philosophical intuitions originate from several early-developed, specialized domains of core knowledge (maturational naturalness). Eliciting and deploying such intuitions in argumentative contexts is the domain of philosophical expertise, thus philosophical intuitions are also practiced nat- ural. This characterization has implications for the evidential value (...)
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  36. Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry.Michael R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.) - 1998 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Ancients and moderns alike have constructed arguments and assessed theories on the basis of common sense and intuitive judgments. Yet, despite the important role intuitions play in philosophy, there has been little reflection on fundamental questions concerning the sort of data intuitions provide, how they are supposed to lead us to the truth, and why we should treat them as important. In addition, recent psychological research seems to pose serious challenges to traditional intuition-driven philosophical inquiry. Rethinking Intuition brings together a (...)
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  37. Intuitions in Linguistics.Michael Devitt - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):481-513.
    Linguists take the intuitive judgments of speakers to be good evidence for a grammar. Why? The Chomskian answer is that they are derived by a rational process from a representation of linguistic rules in the language faculty. The paper takes a different view. It argues for a naturalistic and non-Cartesian view of intuitions in general. They are empirical central-processor responses to phenomena differing from other such responses only in being immediate and fairly unreflective. Applying this to linguistic intuitions yields an (...)
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  38. Intuitions Are Inclinations to Believe.Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.
    Advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy argue that they are treated as evidence because they are evidential. Their opponents agree that they are treated as evidence, but argue that they should not be so used, since they are the wrong kinds of things. In contrast to both, we argue that, despite appearances, intuitions are not treated as evidence in philosophy whether or not they should be. Our positive account is that intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to believe. (...)
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  39. Philosophical Intuitions.Mark Fedyk - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):54-80.
    What exactly is a philosophical intuition? And what makes such an intuition reliable, when it is reliable? This paper provides a terminological framework that is able answer to the first question, and then puts the framework to work developing an answer to the second question. More specifically, the paper argues that we can distinguish between two different "evidential roles" which intuitions can occupy: under certain conditions they can provide information about the representational structure of an intuitor's concept, and under different (...)
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  40. Philosophical Intuitions.Mark Fedyk - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):54.
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  41. Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy: Outline of a Philosophical Revolution.Eugen Fischer - 2011 - Routledge.
    _Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy_ provides new foundations and methods for the revolutionary project of philosophical therapy pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The book vindicates this currently much-discussed project by reconstructing the genesis of important philosophical problems: With the help of concepts adapted from cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology, the book analyses how philosophical reflection is shaped by pictures and metaphors we are not aware of employing and are prone to misapply. Through innovative case-studies on the genesis of classical problems about (...)
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  42. Rationalism and Naturalism in the Age of Experimental Philosophy.Eugen Fischer & John Collins - 2015 - In Eugen Fischer & John Collins (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism. Rethinking Philosophical Method. Routledge. pp. 3-33.
    The paper outlines the evolution of on-going meta-philosophical debates about intuitions, explains different notions of 'intuition' employed in these debates, and argues for the philosophical relevance of intuitions in an aetiological sense taken from cognitive psychology. On this basis, it advocates a new kind of methodological naturalism which it finds implicit, for instance, in the warrant project in experimental philosophy: a meta-philosophical naturalism that promotes the use of scientific methods in meta-philosophical investigations. This 'higher-order' naturalism is consistent with both methodological (...)
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  43. Intuition as an Integral Process of the Mind.Hope Kinyon Fitz - 1981 - Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University
    The thesis which I develop is that intuition is an integral process of the mind by which man can gain: intimations of relations within the phenomenal world; and, intimations of his relations to that which transcends the phenomenal world. ;The method by which I develop this thesis is a comparative study of what two notable philosophers have said about intuition. The philosophers are Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Martin Heidegger . Radhakrishnan was a Hindu, and Heidegger a German. Thus, their views represent (...)
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  44. Intuiciones y contenidos no-conceptuales.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2005 - In Tobies Grimaltós & Julián Pacho (eds.), La Naturalización de la Filosofía: Problemas y Límites. Editorial Pre-Textos. pp. 109.
    Este trabajo propone y defiende una posición racionalista moderada sobre el conocimiento a priori en general y el filosófico en particular, intermedia entre el racionalismo radical y el naturalismo radical. Por racionalismo radical entiendo la tesis de que la justificación de las respuestas a las cuestiones centrales de la filosofía depende sólo de métodos filosóficos de investigación – argumentos intuitivamente válidos que parten de premisas intuitivamente verdaderas, siendo las intuiciones en cuestión de un carácter particular –, no de la ciencia; (...)
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  45. Normalcy and the Contents of Philosophical Judgements.Georgi Gardiner - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):700-740.
    Thought experiments as counterexamples are a familiar tool in philosophy. Frequently understanding a vignette seems to generate a challenge to a target theory. In this paper I explore the content of the judgement that we have in response to these vignettes. I first introduce several competing proposals for the content of our judgement, and explain why they are inadequate. I then advance an alternative view. I argue that when we hear vignettes we consider the normal instances of the vignette. If (...)
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  46. Armchair Versus Questionnaire Polled Intuitions: Intuitions Nevertheless.R. Gasparatou - 2008 - The Reasoner 2 (11):7-9.
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  47. Judgements About Thought Experiments.Alexander Geddes - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):35-67.
    Thought experiments invite us to evaluate philosophical theses by making judgements about hypothetical cases. When the judgements and the theses conflict, it is often the latter that are rejected. But what is the nature of the judgements such that they are able to play this role? I answer this question by arguing that typical judgements about thought experiments are in fact judgements of normal counterfactual sufficiency. I begin by focusing on Anna-Sara Malmgren’s defence of the claim that typical judgements about (...)
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  48. Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 68-89.
    It is a commonplace that contemplation of an imaginary particular may have cognitive and motivational effects that differ from those evoked by an abstract description of an otherwise similar state of affairs. In his Treatise on Human Nature, Hume ([1739] 1978) writes forcefully of this.
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  49. On Folk Epistemology. How We Think and Talk About Knowledge.Mikkel Gerken - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    On Folk Epistemology explores how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. -/- A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. These mistakes are explained (...)
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  50. Epistemic Focal Bias.Mikkel Gerken - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):41 - 61.
    This paper defends strict invariantism against some philosophical and empirical data that have been taken to compromise it. The defence involves a combination of a priori philosophical arguments and empirically informed theorizing. The positive account of the data is an epistemic focal bias account that draws on cognitive psychology. It involves the assumption that, owing to limitations of the involved cognitive resources, intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions are generated by processing only a limited part of the available information?the part that (...)
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