Deterrence and Morality: Interactions and Causal Connections

Dissertation, Washington State University (1998)
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Abstract

The following dissertation explores two issues central to deterrence theory: the contingency effects of moral beliefs on the impact of official sanction threat, and the causal connection between moral beliefs, the threat of official sanction, and crime. Many researchers have examined the possibility that the threat of official sanction, such as arrest, has a deterrent effect only for people with weak moral proscriptions on the behavior. Those with strong moral beliefs are not deterred because they never contemplate the deviant act in the first place. While some research does support this position, researches have tended to look at contingency effects without regard to other factors that surround the decision-making process. For example, to the extent that the rewards for non-criminal alternatives are more available to those with strong moral beliefs , findings that deterrence is contingent on morality may be suspect. This research addresses this issue by employing factorial survey methods that allow for the inclusion of such theoretically relevant variables as the rewards for crime, and the rewards and punishments available through non-criminal alternatives. Further, this dissertation examines the causal relationship between moral beliefs and official sanction, testing a model that posits a positive effect of sanction threat on moral beliefs

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