Free will and the construction of options

Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2913-2933 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What are the distinctive psychological features that explain why humans are free, but many other creatures, such as simple animals, are not? It is natural to think that the answer has something to do with unique human capacities for decision-making. Philosophical discussions of how decision-making works, however, are tellingly incomplete. In particular, these discussions invariably presuppose an agent who has a mentally represented set of options already fully in hand. The emphasis is largely on the selective processes that identify the options most worth doing and then execute them. But where do mentally represented sets of options come from in the first place? Once we focus on this constructive aspect of decision-making, an important fact becomes apparent: While the option sets of simpler animals are sharply limited, humans have a number of striking psychological powers—including remarkable powers of prospection and creativity—that enable them to construct option sets of unparalleled size and diversity. As a result, humans can express themselves in countless ways. This latitude for self-expression is, I argue, the distinctive feature that explains why humans are free.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,642

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Predicament of Choice.Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12:294-313.
The Predicament of Choice.Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12. Oxford University Press. pp. 294-313.
The Experience of Free Will.Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias - forthcoming - In Joe Campbell, Kristin Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Free Will. Blackwell. pp. 417-433.
The Two-Stage Solution to the Problem of Free Will.Robert O. Doyle - 2013 - In Antoine Suarez Peter Adams (ed.), Is Science Compatible with Free Will? Springer. pp. 235-254.
Options and Agency.Maier John - 2022 - Palgrave Macmillan.
IIA, rationality, and the individuation of options.Tina Rulli & Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):205-221.
Animal Cognition and Self-Awareness.Paul Veatch Moriarty - 1997 - Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-02-27

Downloads
21 (#762,792)

6 months
113 (#41,806)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Chandra Sripada
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

References found in this work

Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 40 references / Add more references