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Summary This category is used for topics that have not been a focus of major attention in the free will debate and which therefore do not have categories of their own devoted to them. 
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  1. added 2020-05-11
    Can Life Be Meaningful Without Free Will?Drew Chastain - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1069-1086.
    If we lack deep free agency, like that supposed by metaphysical libertarianism, should we view life as meaningless, pointless, or not worth living? Here I present a new argument in support of meaning-compatibilism, or the view that life can indeed be meaningful without our having deep free agency. I show that this argument secures meaning-compatibilism more effectively than an argument provided by Derk Pereboom. In the process, we learn that Susan Wolf’s hybrid theory of meaning in life is not equipped (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-11
    Free Love? On the Relation Between Belief in Free Will, Determinism, and Passionate Love.Jordane Boudesseul, Anthony Lantian, Florian Cova & Laurent Bègue - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 46:47-59.
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  3. added 2020-05-11
    Meaning and Free Will.John Hospers - 1949 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (3):307-330.
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  4. added 2020-03-21
    Dependence, Transcendence, and Creaturely Freedom: On the Incompatibility of Three Theistic Doctrines.Aaron Segal - forthcoming - Mind.
    In this paper I argue for the incompatibility of three claims, each of them quite attractive to a theist. First, the doctrine of deep dependence: the universe depends for its existence, in a non-causal way, on God. Second, the doctrine of true transcendence: the universe is wholly distinct from God; God is separate and apart from the universe in respect of mereology, modes, and mentality. Third, the doctrine of robust creaturely freedom: some creature performs some act such that he could (...)
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  5. added 2020-03-19
    Necessity and Free Will in the Thought of Bardaisan of Edessa.Tim Hegedus - 2003 - Laval Théologique et Philosophique 59 (2):333-344.
    We examine here how the Syrian philosopher and theologian Bardaisan conciliates necessary fate and free will in man. Our study is based on an examination of the Book of the Laws of Countries, a dialogue on free will and astral fate, featuring Bardaisan, a few of his disciples and an opponent. Résumé Cet article examine la manière dont le philosophe et théologien syrien Bardesane concilie la nécessité du destin et le libre arbitre de l’homme. L’étude est menée sur la base (...)
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  6. added 2020-02-14
    Free Will: Real or Illusion - A Debate.Gregg D. Caruso, Christian List & Cory J. Clark - 2020 - The Philosopher 108 (1).
    Debate on free will with Christian List, Gregg Caruso, and Cory Clark. The exchange is focused on Christian List's book Why Free Will Is Real.
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  7. added 2020-02-12
    Consciousness and Freedom: Three Views.Eliot Deutsch - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (8):224-227.
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  8. added 2020-02-10
    Fate and Freedom: A Philosophy for Free Americans.C. L. S. - 1945 - Journal of Philosophy 42 (26):722-723.
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  9. added 2020-01-25
    Free Will, Grace, and Anti-Pelagianism.Taylor W. Cyr & Matthew T. Flummer - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83 (2):183-199.
    Critics of synergism often complain that the view entails Pelagianism, and so, critics think, monergism looks like the only live option. Critics of monergism often claim that the view entails that the blame for human sin ultimately traces to God. Recently, several philosophers have attempted to chart a middle path by offering soteriological accounts which are monergistic but maintain the resistibility of God’s grace. In this paper, we present a challenge to such accounts of the resistibility of grace, namely that (...)
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  10. added 2020-01-18
    Descartes on Human Freedom.Marie Jayasekera - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):527-539.
    In this paper, I explore René Descartes' conception of human freedom. I begin with the key interpretive challenges of Descartes' remarks and then turn to two foundational issues in the secondary literature: the philosophical backdrop of Descartes' remarks and the notions of freedom that commentators have used to characterize Descartes. The remainder of the paper is focused on the main current debate: Descartes' position on the relationship between freedom and determinism.
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  11. added 2020-01-08
    Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism.Nadine Elzein - 2020 - In Peter Róna & László Zsolnai (eds.), Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics. Virtues and Economics, vol 5. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 3-20.
    While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, (...)
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  12. added 2019-12-25
    Why Frankfurt-Examples Don’T Need to Succeed to Succeed.Felipe Leon & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):551-565.
    In this paper we argue that defenders of Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities do not need to construct a metaphysically possible scenario in which an agent is morally responsible despite lacking the ability to do otherwise. Rather, there is a weaker (but equally legitimate) sense in which Frankfurt-style counterexamples can succeed. All that's needed is the claim that the ability to do otherwise is no part of what grounds moral responsibility, when the agent is indeed morally responsible.
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  13. added 2019-11-07
    Replies to Randolph Clarke, John Bishop, and Helen Beebee.Helen Steward - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):547-557.
    Contains the author's responses to comments by the three named authors on her book, 'A Metaphysics for Freedom'.
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  14. added 2019-10-07
    Anselm on Freedom and the Will: A Discussion of G. Stanley Kane’s Interpretation of Anselm.Jasper Hopkins - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:471-493.
    C. Stanley Kane’s book, Anselm’s Doctrine of Freedom and The Will, is the only monograph in English on this topic. It will therefore influence a wide array of students and scholars. The book advances five theses: that Anselm operates with a general ontological principle to the effect that the essential nature of anything is determined by its purpose in existing; that Anselm’s theory of the will is not determinist but a variant of indeterminism; that human freedom, for Anselm, consists in (...)
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  15. added 2019-09-19
    Ways to Be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility.Elinor Mason - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    Elinor Mason draws on ethics and responsibility theory to present a pluralistic view of both wrongness and blameworthiness. Mason argues that our moral concepts, rightness and wrongness, must be connected to our responsibility concepts. But the connection is not simple. She identifies three different ways to be blameworthy, corresponding to different ways of acting wrongly. The paradigmatic way to be blameworthy is to act subjectively wrongly. Mason argues for an account of subjective obligation that is connected to the notion of (...)
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  16. added 2019-08-30
    The Challenge of the Freedom and Responsibility of Science.Juliana González - 2003 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 81 (1):217-224.
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  17. added 2019-08-21
    Libertà del volere – dalla filosofia teoretica alla filosofia pratica. Un dialogo con Sandro Nannini.Christoph Lumer - 2018 - In Christoph Lumer & Giacomo Romano (eds.), Libertà del volere – dalla filosofia teoretica alla filosofia pratica. Un dialogo con Sandro Nannini. Roma; Messina (Italy): corisco. pp. 53-84.
    The article, first, reconstructs and criticizes Sandro Nannini’s incompatibilistic concept of freedom of decision and, second, develops a compatibilistic alternative, a synthesis of a rationalistic and an autonomous approach. Nannini justifies his conception primarily from a naturalistic point of view: it reflects our sense of agency, so he says. This is criticized as empirically wrong and methodically mistaken: The theory of freedom of decision is, actually, normative; it is about good decisions; naturalism cannot establish normative claims. The alternative is based, (...)
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  18. added 2019-08-16
    Reflections on the Incompatibilist’s Direct Argument.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):1 - 19.
    The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by (...)
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  19. added 2019-08-16
    The Conditional Analysis of Freedom.Carl Ginet - 1980 - In P. Van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel. pp. 171-186.
  20. added 2019-08-09
    Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action.E. J. Lowe - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    This theory accords to volitions the status of basic mental actions, maintaining that these are spontaneous exercises of the will--a "two-way" power which ...
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  21. added 2019-08-09
    Intention, Freedom and Predictability.Peter Geach - 2000 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46:73-.
    Elizabeth Anscombe's most important philosophical work has been on intention and action: in her book Intention and in many of her articles. To read Intention is like watching somebody hew a path with a machete through a jungle of confusion and mythology. Such work is never done, for the jungle grows apace. Here I take up some of the task.
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  22. added 2019-08-09
    What We Can Say About What We Can Do: A Defense of the Conditional Analysis of 'Can'.Jan Thomas - 1995 - Philosophical Papers 24 (3):167-182.
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  23. added 2019-07-29
    Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256.
    How is the problem of free will related to the problem of moral luck? In this essay, I answer that question and outline a new solution to the paradox of moral luck, the source-paradox solution. This solution both explains why the paradox arises and why moral luck does not exist. To make my case, I highlight a few key connections between the paradox of moral luck and two related problems, namely the problem of free will and determinism and the paradox (...)
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  24. added 2019-07-29
    The Free Will Defense Revisited: The Instrumental Value of Significant Free Will.Frederick Choo & Esther Goh - 2019 - International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science (4):32-45.
    Alvin Plantinga has famously responded to the logical problem of evil by appealing to the intrinsic value of significant free will. A problem, however, arises because traditional theists believe that both God and the redeemed who go to heaven cannot do wrong acts. This entails that both God and the redeemed in heaven lack significant freedom. If significant freedom is indeed valuable, then God and the redeemed in heaven would lack something intrinsically valuable. However, if significant freedom is not intrinsically (...)
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  25. added 2019-07-29
    Self-Determination Vs. Freedom for God and the Angels: A Problem with Anselm's Theory of Free Will.Michael Barnwell - 2018 - The Saint Anselm Journal 14 (1):13-32.
    Anselm is known for offering a distinctive definition of freedom of choice as “the ability of preserving uprightness of will for its own sake.” When we turn to Anselm’s account of the devil’s fall in De Casu Diaboli, however, this idiosyncratic understanding of freedom is not at the forefront. In that text, Anselm seemingly assumes a traditional understanding of free will defined in terms of alternative possibilities for the angels. These alternative possibilities must be present so the angels can engage (...)
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  26. added 2019-07-26
    Reinach, Material Necessity, and Free Variation.Nebojsa Kujundzic - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (4):721-.
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  27. added 2019-07-26
    Uncertainty and Free Choice: A Reply.Bernard Wand - 1964 - Dialogue 3 (2):171-175.
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  28. added 2019-07-19
    Does Evil Have a Cause? Augustine's Perplexity and Thomas's Answer.Carlos Steel - 1994 - Review of Metaphysics 48 (2):251 - 273.
    IN THE DISCUSSION on education in the Republic, Socrates lays down the principles which those who speak about the gods must follow if they want to avoid the errors of traditional mythology. The first typos of this rational theology is this: "God is the cause, not of all things, but only of the good." For "God, being good, cannot be responsible for everything happening in our life, as is commonly believed, but only for a small part. For we have a (...)
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  29. added 2019-07-19
    Motive and Intention.James Andrew Fulton - 1973 - International Philosophical Quarterly 13 (4):575-581.
  30. added 2019-06-28
    The Efficacy of Reasons: A Reply to Hendrickson.Timothy O’Connor - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):135-137.
    Noel Hendrickson, in “Against an Agent-Causal Theory of Action” (this volume), carefully and intelligently probes aspects of the agent-causal account of free will I present in Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. The central target of his criticism is my contention that agent-causal events, by their very nature, cannot be caused. Here, I respond to his argument on this point.
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  31. added 2019-06-06
    The Indeterminist Intuition: Source and Status.Shaun Nichols - 2012 - The Monist 95 (2):290-307.
    Evidence from experimental philosophy indicates that people think that their choices are not determined. What remains unclear is why people think this. Denying determinism is rather presumptuous given people’s general ignorance about the nature of the universe. In this paper, I’ll argue that the belief in indeterminism depends on a default presumption that we know the factors that influence our decision making. That presumption was reasonable at earlier points in intellectual history. But in light of work in cognitive science, we (...)
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  32. added 2019-06-06
    Default Compatibilism and Narrativity: Comments on John Martin Fischer’s Ways and Stories.Michael Nelson - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):35-45.
    I discuss two claims defended in Fischer’s recent work. The first is the default status of compatibilism. This is part of a conception of our agency and moral responsibility as being independent of the truth or the falsity of the thesis of determinism. I try to further bolster Fischer’s arguments in favor of this position. The second is Fischer’s defense of the narrative conception of moral responsibility, according to which the value of self-expression supports and explicates the value of being (...)
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  33. added 2019-06-06
    Anselm’s Definition of Free Will: A Hierarchical Interpretation.Stan R. Tyvoll - 2006 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):155-171.
    Anselm defines free will as “the ability to keep uprightness of will for the sake of uprightness itself ” rather than as the ability to sin or not sin. I fulfill two objectives pertaining to his definition. First, I show that his definition should be interpreted as a hierarchical account of free will, one that emphasizes the idea that an agent’s will is free if she is able to have the will she wants to have. The interpretationis based on Anselm’s (...)
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  34. added 2019-06-06
    No Free Will.Will Provine - 1999 - Isis 90 (S2):S117-S132.
  35. added 2019-06-06
    Assessing Responsibility: Fixing Blame Versus Fixing Problems.John T. Sanders - 1993 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 12 (4):73-86.
    In the midst of even the most tragic circumstances attending the aftermath of disaster, and co-existing with a host of complex emotions, arises a practical consideration: how might similar tragedies be prevented in the future? The complexity of such situations must not be neglected. More than mere prevention must usually be taken into consideration. But the practical question is of considerable importance. In what follows, I will offer some reasons for being concerned that efforts to fix the problem -- efforts, (...)
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  36. added 2019-06-06
    Predetermination and Free Will in the Teaching of Ramana Maharsi.Arvind Sharma - 1984 - Religious Studies 20 (4):615-626.
    Ramana Maharsi is one of the lesser lights of modern Indian thought but a major figure in the context of modern Advaitic thought in Hinduism. Modern Indian thought in general is distinguished by a robust confidence in the efficacy of effort as an expression of free will, a confidence it shares with the temper of the West in general and which it may have imbibed by coming in contact with it. Modern Advaitic thought, as represented by its popular modern exponents (...)
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  37. added 2019-06-06
    Free Will and Practical Reason.Richard Reilly - 1976 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 50:51.
  38. added 2019-06-06
    Free‐Will and the Undesirability of Moral Education.David Gordon - 1975 - Educational Theory 25 (4):407-416.
  39. added 2019-06-05
    Choice, Blind Spots and Free Will.Charles Devellennes - 2014 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 40 (9):895-911.
    This article shows that the concept of choice is central to Isaiah Berlin’s liberalism. It argues that his valuing of choice is anchored in a particular conception of human nature, one that assumes and presupposes free will. Berlin’s works sketch a metaphysics of choice, and his reluctance to situate himself openly in the debate on free will is unconvincing. By introducing the theory of autopoiesis, this article further suggests that there is a way to take Berlin’s value pluralism seriously, by (...)
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  40. added 2019-06-05
    Free Will as a Sceptical Threat to Knowing.Stephen Hetherington - 1999 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 3 (1):139-154.
    Sceptics standardly argue that a person lacks knowledge due to an inability to know that some dire possibility is not being actualised in her believing that p. I argue that the usual sceptical inventory of such possibilities should include one's possibly having had some freedom in forming one's belief that p. A sceptic should conclude that wherever there might have been some such freedom, there is no knowledge that p.
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  41. added 2019-04-08
    Van Cleve on Reid on Exertion and Incompatibilism.Gideon Yaffe - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):539-550.
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  42. added 2019-04-08
    Anselm on Freedom and Grace.James A. Gibson - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 5:88-121.
    The chapter presents Anselm’s incompatibilist account of human freedom within the context of his theodicy and presents two arguments against his account. Both arguments aim to show there is a genuine conflict between his account of freedom and the role of God’s grace in making agents just. The first argument, the problem of harmonization, highlights the conflict within the soteriological context where an agent changes from being unjust to being just. The second argument, the problem of just creation, highlights the (...)
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  43. added 2019-04-05
    The Science of Freewill.Michael Ward - 2004 - Philosophy Pathways 83.
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  44. added 2019-04-05
    Time, Will, and Mental Process.Jason W. Brown - 1996
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  45. added 2019-04-05
    Freedom and Agency.Amartya Sen - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):203-221.
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  46. added 2019-03-29
    Rezension: Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness. Narrative and the Problem of Suffering. [REVIEW]Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla - 2012 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):97-103.
    Eleonore Stump claims in her book 'Wandering in Darkness' that the problem of evil can be solved best by the help of narratives. In this review her argumentation for this claim is explicated.
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  47. added 2019-03-29
    Causality, Agency, Explanation: A Perspective on Free Will and the Problem of Evil.Martin Edgar Gerwin - 1985 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    The starting point of this essay is the theological problem of evil and the argument known as the Free Will Defence. I argue that the construction of a successful Free Will Defence requires one to adopt a libertarian account of human free will; and the attempt to defend libertarianism leads to an examination of causality and explanation. ;The theory of explanation developed here is pluralistic, in that it recognizes differing patterns of explanation as valid. At the same time it is (...)
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  48. added 2019-03-29
    Divine Freedom.Thomas Patrick Flint - 1980 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Though the problem of divine freedom is thus resolved in Chapter III, several closely connected difficulties remain. In Chapter IV, I discuss three of these issues. Though I argue for the traditional view that God was free to refrain from creating and is both omnipotent and morally praiseworthy despite his inability to do evil, I concede that an Anselmian libertarian could coherently reach different conclusions on each of these matters. ;The dissertation concludes with a brief closing section wherein I defend (...)
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  49. added 2019-03-29
    J. K. HEYDON, Freewill and Science. [REVIEW]Martin Jarrett-Kerr - 1944 - Hibbert Journal 43:91.
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  50. added 2019-03-29
    SPEARMAN, C. - The Abilities of Man. [REVIEW]J. Drever - 1928 - Mind 37:215.
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