Free Will: Helen Steward Interviewed by Stephen Law

Think 22 (65):5-10 (2023)
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Abstract

Do we have free will? In this interview, Helen Steward explains part of her very distinctive approach to the philosophical puzzle concerning free will vs determinism. Steward rejects determinism, but not because she denies that we are not material beings (because, for example, we have Cartesian, immaterial souls that have physical effects). Her reasons for rejecting determinism are very different.

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Author Profiles

Helen Steward
University of Leeds
Stephen C. Law
University of Central Oklahoma

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