Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):1-24 (2009)

Authors
Jesse Steinberg
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Abstract
I argue that there is a continuum of judgments ranging from those that are affectively rich, what might be called passionate judgments, to those that are purely cognitive and nonaffective, what might be called dispassionate judgments. The former are akin to desires and other affective states and so are necessarily motivating. Applying this schema to moral judgments, I maintain that the motivational internalist is wrong in claiming that all moral judgments are necessarily motivating, but right in regard to the subset of passionate moral judgments. This picture of moral judgments has implications for related debates in metaethics between cognitivists and non-cognitivists and between Humeans and anti-Humeans
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2009.10717641
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What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Moral Problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.

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