Philosophiques 28 (1):151-171 (2001)

Authors
Sarah Stroud
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
La pensée morale ordinaire semble incorporer une adhésion à des contraintes ou des restrictions déontologiques : des interdictions qui restent en vigueur même dans des cas où les actions interdites constituent le seul moyen de prévenir des conséquences encore pires. La source de ces normes déontologiques, cependant, n'est pas évidente. Plusieurs tentatives récentes pour trouver une base aux restrictions déontologiques ou pour expliquer ce qui les génère sont examinées. La plus prometteuse insiste sur la valeur intrinsèque du statut moral protégé que la morale déontologique attribue à chacun de nous. On discutera brièvement les points forts d'une telle approche et les difficultés auxquelles elle fait face.Ordinary moral thought seems to reflect a commitment to deontological constraints or restrictions on conduct: to prohibitions which remain in force even if such actions are the only way to avert still worse consequences. The source of these deontological norms, however, is not clear. Several recent attempts to offer a basis for deontological restrictions or to explain what gives rise to them are examined. The most promising such attempt emphasizes the intrinsic value of the protected moral status which deontological morality ascribes to each of us. The strong points of such an approach and the difficulties facing it are briefly discussed
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DOI 10.7202/004989ar
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory.Sarah Stroud - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):170–189.
Agent-Centered Restrictions From the Inside Out.Stephen Darwall - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (3):291 - 319.

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