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Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings
Thinking and Reasoning 19 (1):54 - 77 (2013)
Abstract
(2013). Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings. Thinking & Reasoning: Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 54-77. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2012.735622My notes
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Citations of this work
Not All Who Ponder Count Costs: Arithmetic reflection predicts utilitarian tendencies, but logical reflection predicts both deontological and utilitarian tendencies.Nick Byrd & Paul Conway - 2019 - Cognition 192 (103995).
Advancing the specification of dual process models of higher cognition: a critical test of the hybrid model view.Bence Bago & Wim De Neys - 2019 - Thinking and Reasoning 26 (1):1-30.
Predicting individual differences in conflict detection and bias susceptibility during reasoning.Jakub Šrol & Wim De Neys - 2020 - Thinking and Reasoning 27 (1):38-68.
The cognitive reflection test revisited: exploring the ways individuals solve the test.B. Szaszi, A. Szollosi, B. Palfi & B. Aczel - 2017 - Thinking and Reasoning 23 (3):207-234.
Comprehension and computation in Bayesian problem solving.Eric D. Johnson & Elisabet Tubau - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:137658.
References found in this work
The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.Steven A. Sloman - 1996 - Psychological Bulletin 119 (1):3-22.
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (4):650-669.
Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):251-252.
Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):233-248.
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