Abstract
Part I of Language and Time is a defence of the tensed theory of time, the view that assertions about events happening now or being past or future are irreducible to tenseless assertions about the dates at which events happen or about their occurrence before or after other events. It claims that tensed sentences are not translatable by tenseless sentences, nor do they have the same truth conditions as tenseless sentences. They are reducible in neither of these senses either to tenseless date sentences—e.g. “it is raining today” does not have the same truth conditions as “it is raining on 22 February 1994”; nor to token reflexive sentences—e.g. “it is raining now” does not have the same truth conditions as “it is raining simultaneously with this utterance”. Hence, Smith argues, since evidently some tensed sentences are true, they must express propositions of a different kind from tenseless propositions—viz. tensed propositions.