Moral value, response-dependence, and rigid designation

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):71-94 (2006)
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Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1353/cjp.2006.0005
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References found in this work BETA
Moral Realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:89-174.
Two Notions of Necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
Facts and Values.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.
Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense".Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:249-314.

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Citations of this work BETA
Practices and the Direct Perception of Normative States.Julie Zahle - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (4):493-518.

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