What do you do with misleading evidence?

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):557–569 (2004)
Gilbert Harman has presented an argument to the effect that if S knows that p then S knows that any evidence for not-p is misleading. Therefore S is warranted in being dogmatic about anything he happens to know. I explain, and reject, Sorensen's attempt to solve the paradox via Jackson's theory of conditionals. S is not in a position to disregard evidence even when he knows it to be misleading
Keywords dogmatism puzzle  junk knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00372.x
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.

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The Dogmatism Puzzle.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (3):1-16.

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