What do you do with misleading evidence?

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):557–569 (2004)
Gilbert Harman has presented an argument to the effect that if S knows that p then S knows that any evidence for not-p is misleading. Therefore S is warranted in being dogmatic about anything he happens to know. I explain, and reject, Sorensen's attempt to solve the paradox via Jackson's theory of conditionals. S is not in a position to disregard evidence even when he knows it to be misleading
Keywords dogmatism puzzle  junk knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00372.x
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.

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Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2013). The Dogmatism Puzzle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (3):1-16.

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