- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Conceptual Change in Visual Neuroscience: The Receptive Field Concept
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 34 (1):41-57 (2021)
Abstract
I focus on the concept of the receptive field of a sensory neuron, taking it as a prominent case to address conceptual change in the history of neuroscience. I argue for an interpretation of its ro...Author's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
The Embedded Neuron, the Enactive Field?M. Chirimuuta & I. Gold - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press.
Conceptual Change and Tool Development: The Challenges of the Neurosciences to the Philosophy of Scientific Revolutions.Sergio Daniel Barberis - 2022 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 20:165-181.
Comparing different stimulus configurations for population receptive field mapping in human fMRI.Ivan Alvarez, Benjamin de Haas, Chris A. Clark, Geraint Rees & D. Samuel Schwarzkopf - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
Receptive field organization of simple and complex cells.Paul Heggelund - 1985 - In David Rose & Vernon G. Dobson (eds.), Models of the Visual Cortex. New York: Wiley.
Visual receptive field organisation and spatial reference transformation in macaque posterior parietal cortex.V. Prevosto, F. Klam & W. Graf - 2004 - In Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception. Malden Ma: Blackwell. pp. 166-166.
Two hands are better than one: A new assessment method and a new interpretation of the non-visual illusion of self-touch.Rebekah C. White, Anne M. Aimola Davies & Martin Davies - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):956-964.
Two hands are better than one: A new assessment method and a new interpretation of the non-visual illusion of self-touch.Rebekah White, Anne Aimola Davies & Martin Davies - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):956-964.
Conceptual change and conceptual engineering: the case of colour concepts.Lieven Decock - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (1-2):168-185.
Cancer Prevention in Brazil.Luiz Alves Araújo Neto - 2022 - Contributions to the History of Concepts 17 (2):1-17.
Conceptual change and conceptual enrichment: a frame-based reconstruction of Austin’s theory of speech acts.Stephan Kornmesser - 2023 - Synthese 203 (1):1-24.
Analytics
Added to PP
2021-11-20
Downloads
17 (#896,762)
6 months
7 (#491,177)
2021-11-20
Downloads
17 (#896,762)
6 months
7 (#491,177)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Evolving Concepts of Functional Localization.Joseph B. McCaffrey - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (5):e12914.
References found in this work
The Epistemic Goal of a Concept: Accounting for the Rationality of Semantic Change and Variation.Ingo Brigandt - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):19-40.
Entering new fields: Exploratory uses of experimentation.Friedrich Steinle - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):74.
Explaining evolutionary innovations and novelties: Criteria of explanatory adequacy and epistemological prerequisites.Alan C. Love - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):874-886.
Conceptualizing Evolutionary Novelty: Moving Beyond Definitional Debates.Ingo Brigandt & Alan C. Love - 2012 - Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution 318:417-427.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-68866f4b87-lc8fp uwo