The old principal principle reconciled with the new
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
 You have a crystal ball. Unfortunately, it’s defective. Rather than predicting the future, it gives you the chances of future events. Is it then of any use? It certainly seems so. You may not know for sure whether the stock market will crash next week; but if you know for sure that it has an 80% chance of crashing, then you should be 80% confident that it will—and you should plan accordingly. More generally, given that the chance of a proposition A is x%, your conditional credence in A should be x%. This is a chance-credence principle: a principle relating chance (objective probability) with credence (subjective probability, degree of belief). Let’s call it the Minimal Principle (MP).
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Milan M. Ćirković (2006). Is Quantum Suicide Painless? On an Apparent Violation of the Principal Principle. Foundations of Science 11 (3):287-296.
Jonathan Schaffer (2003). Principled Chances. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):27-41.
Robert Black (1998). Chance, Credence, and the Principal Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):371-385.
Peter B. M. Vranas (2004). Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):368–382.
Ned Hall (2004). Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
Frank Arntzenius & Ned Hall (2003). On What We Know About Chance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):171-179.
Richard Pettigrew (2013). What Chance‐Credence Norms Should Not Be. Noûs 47 (3):177-196.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads84 ( #57,546 of 1,925,097 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #418,130 of 1,925,097 )
How can I increase my downloads?