Possible World Semantics and True-True Counterfactuals

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):322-346 (2016)

Abstract

The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that rejecting the latter should be a consequence of rejecting the former. Instead I consider how one might defuse putative counterexamples to the truth of true-true counterfactuals.

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Lee Walters
University of Southampton

References found in this work

Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1974 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.

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Citations of this work

Sensitivity, Safety, and Impossible Worlds.Guido Melchior - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):713-729.
Dispositions and Tricks.Gabriele Contessa - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):587-596.
Conjunction, Connection and Counterfactuals.Chaoan He - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):705-719.
In Defense of a Probability Based Semantics for Counterfactuals.Lars Gundersen & Mads Olesen - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):538-549.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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