David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy 78 (3):369-386 (2003)
Hume is sometimes thought to provide a ‘naturalistic’ response to the sceptic. I consider two ways in which this response may be construed. According to the first, the fact that we are psychologically determined to hold a belief provides it with justification. According to the second, ‘natural’ beliefs provide limits within which reason can legitimately be employed, limits which the sceptic transgresses when he attempts to defend his position. Both versions of the naturalistic response to scepticism, I will argue, aren't plausible. And they aren't, at least not predominantly, Hume's.
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Don Garrett (2007). Reasons to Act and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume's Philosophical Project. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):1 - 16.
Don Garrett (2007). Reasons to Act and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume’s Philosophical Project. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):1-16.
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