Philosophy 78 (3):369-386 (2003)

Authors
Ruth Weintraub
Tel Aviv University
Abstract
Hume is sometimes thought to provide a ‘naturalistic’ response to the sceptic. I consider two ways in which this response may be construed. According to the first, the fact that we are psychologically determined to hold a belief provides it with justification. According to the second, ‘natural’ beliefs provide limits within which reason can legitimately be employed, limits which the sceptic transgresses when he attempts to defend his position. Both versions of the naturalistic response to scepticism, I will argue, aren't plausible. And they aren't, at least not predominantly, Hume's.
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DOI 10.1017/s0031819103000354
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