Philosophical Studies 132 (1):1-16 (2007)

Authors
Don Garrett
New York University
Abstract
Is Hume a naturalist? Does he regard all or nearly all beliefs and actions as rationally unjustified? In order to settle these questions, it is necessary to examine their key terms and to understand the character-especially the normative character-of Hume's philosophical project. This paper argues that Hume is a naturalist-and, in particular, both a moral and an epistemic naturalist-in quite robust ways; and that Hume can properly regard many actions and beliefs as "rationally justified" in several different senses of that term.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-006-9055-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,556
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Hume's Positive Argument on Induction.Hsueh Qu - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):595-625.
Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):517-539.
An Old Problem for the New Rationalism.Yuval Avnur - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):175-185.
Mere Faith and Entitlement.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):297-315.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Naturalism and Scepticism.Martin Bell & Marie McGinn - 1990 - Philosophy 65 (254):399 - 418.
The Humean Problem of Induction and Carroll’s Paradox.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):357 - 376.
Irrational Desires.Donald C. Hubin - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (1):23 - 44.
Belief, Normativity and the Constitution of Agency.Emer O'Hagan - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):39-52.
Evidence and its Limits.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.
Prudence and the Reasons of Rational Persons.Duncan MacIntosh - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):346 – 365.
Kant and Naturalism Reconsidered.John H. Zammito - 2008 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):532 – 558.
Normative Naturalism and the Rationality of Goals.Michael Ingertson - 1994 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
316 ( #21,784 of 2,326,561 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #72,806 of 2,326,561 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes