Social choice and normative population theory: A person affecting solution to Parfit's mere addition paradox

Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):263 - 282 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,774

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Corrigendum: The Paradox Defended.[author unknown] - 1967 - Philosophical Studies 18 (3):48-48.
Murder most gentle: The paradox deepens.Lou Goble - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (2):217 - 227.
Plural quantification and the axiom of choice.Stephen Pollard - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 54 (3):393 - 397.
Correction: Mr. Weiss on the Paradox of Necessary Truth.[author unknown] - 1956 - Philosophical Studies 7 (4):64-64.
The fittingness theory of truth.David B. Resnik - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (1):95 - 101.
A new defense of Tarski's solution to the liar paradox.Gila Sher - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5-6):1441-1466.
Staying in touch with normative reality.Peter Railton - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):459 - 467.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
65 (#86,957)

6 months
9 (#1,260,759)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Clark Wolf
Iowa State University

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
A theory of justice.John Rawls - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring ethics: an introductory anthology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 133-135.
The methods of ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1874 - Bristol, U.K.: Thoemmes Press. Edited by Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones.

View all 28 references / Add more references