Externalist Thought Experiments and Direction of Fit

Argumenta 3 (1):139-156 (2017)
Authors
Casey Woodling
Coastal Carolina University
Abstract
The classic thought experiments for Content Externalism have been motivated by consideration of intentional states with a mind-to-world direction of fit. In this paper, I argue that when these experiments are run on intentional states with a world-to-mind direction of fit, the thought experiments actually support Content Internalism. Because of this, I argue that the classic thought experiments alone cannot properly motivate Content Externalism. I do not show that Content Externalism is false in this paper, just that it cannot be motivated by the classic thought experiments alone. I discuss various externalist responses to the argument I raise and show that they all fail.
Keywords Content externalism  Content internalism  Thought experiments  Tyler Burge  Twin Earth
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