Emergency behavior

There is a class of actions — reflex actions — which seem not to spring from any intention, but for which we nevertheless wish to take responsibility. It is suggested that these actions are appropriately said to be done intentionally, in spite of our never having an intention to do them. And this grammatical anomaly indicates that the behavior in question requires a special kind of account; one which might be characterized as derivative: parasitic on the more paradigmatic sort of action explanation.
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DOI 10.1080/00201747408601713
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References found in this work BETA
Explanation and Teleology.Larry Wright - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (2):204-218.

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Refraining.Robert E. Moore - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 36 (4):407 - 424.

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