Memory and Cognition 28 (3):452-465 (2000)

The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of the situations described in premises, and that these models normally represent only what is true. The theory has an unexpected consequence. It predicts the existence ofillusions in inferences. Certain inferences should have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Two experiments corroborated the occurrence of such illusions in inferences about what is possible from disjunctions of quantified assertions, such as, “at least some of the plastic beads are not red.” Experiment 1 showed that participants erroneously inferred that impossible situations were possible, and that possible situations were impossible, but that they performed well with control problems based on the same premises. Experiment 2 corroborated these findings in inferences from assertions based on dyadic relations, such as, “all the boys played with the girls.”
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DOI 10.3758/BF03198560
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