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Non-cognitivism and motivation
In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New essays on the explanation of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 416--24 (2009)
Abstract
In sum, the non-cognitivist account of motivation is far from unproblematic. The non-cognitivist has trouble telling us what moral attitudes are in a way that is consistent with the phenomenon of variable motivation. Given that the cognitivist has an easy explanation of variable motivation, it seems that cognitivism is preferable to non-cognitivism on the score of motivation, which is a reversal of the way the issue is usually perceived.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Recent Work on Motivational Internalism.Fredrik Björklund, Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Caj Strandberg - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):124-137.
Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem.Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):1-38.
Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):233-255.
Practical Oomph: A Case for Subjectivism.Matthew Bedke - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):657-677.
The motivation argument and motivational internalism.Daniel Eggers - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2445-2467.
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