Logic and Logical Philosophy 26 (4):563-581 (2017)

Elia Zardini
Universidade de Lisboa
Milne [2005] argued that a sentence saying of itself that it does not have a truthmaker is true but does not have a truthmaker. López de Sa and Zardini [2006] worried that, by parity of reasoning, one should conclude that a sentence saying of itself that it is not both true and short is true but not short. Recently, Milne [2013] and Gołosz [2015] have replied to López de Sa and Zardini’s worry, arguing in different ways that the worry is illfounded. In this paper, I’ll address these replies and argue that they fail to dispel López de Sa and Zardini’s worry, bringing out in the process some broader points concerning the use of self-referential sentences in arguments in philosophy of logic.
Keywords diagonalisation   factivity   incompleteness   necessitation   reductio ad absurdum   semantic paradoxes   truthmaking
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DOI 10.12775/LLP.2017.004
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References found in this work BETA

Truth Without Contra(di)Ction.Elia Zardini - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):498-535.
Truthmakers.Fraser MacBride - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Paradox Regained.D. Kaplan & R. Montague - 1960 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1 (3):79-90.
A Calculus for Antinomies.F. G. Asenjo - 1966 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 16 (1):103-105.

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Citations of this work BETA

Instability and Contraction: Méditations Hégéliennes I.Elia Zardini - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):155-188.
Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge. A Classical Solution to the Paradox of Knowability.Elia Zardini - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (3):365-392.

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