In Theory of the Partisan, Carl Schmitt outlines a theory of the history of the partisan beginning in 1808, when the Spanish guerilla defeated Napoleon. After that modern nation states began to integrate guerilla war tactics in their strategies. According to Schmitt, this development was intensified during the 20th century, but in a dangerous manner. Arguably, Russia’s actions in Ukraine 2014 and 2022 suggest that Schmitt’s conception is still relevant for understanding extreme political situations. But why do sovereign states need (...) the partisan? The big loser in this development, however, is the partisan himself, who gets exploited and instrumentalized by regular political actors. Even if Schmitt advocates a less extreme way of using the partisan, he arguably helps placing it under the rule of state actors, a tactic Putin’s Russia deploys in action. Therefore, a political rehabilitation of the partisan from its exploitation is very needed. (shrink)

In contrast to the constantly increasing surveillance of the streets of cities, Jane Jacobs’ theory of the ‘eyes on the street’ offers a theory of a positive form of surveillance and these eyes can thus perhaps take on the role of a counterforce to problematic forms of surveillance. To examine under what conditions Jacobs could help formulate such a counterforce is the main aim in this article. But for this purpose, certain obstacles need to be addressed, for instance, the usage (...) of Jacobs’ theory in the field of CPTED. What in Jacobs’ theory makes it vulnerable to this kind of usage? In order for Jacobs’ street-eyes to avoid becoming a prolonged arm for state surveillance, this article suggests a critical reading of Jacobs’ thinking in relation to Foucault’s surveillance-critique, ultimately with the aim to strengthen her eyes on the street. (shrink)

Chantal Mouffe, Slavoj Žižek, and Julia Kristeva contribute in a problematic manner to the ontologizing of political antagonisms and hence also to the cementing of unfreedom. While showing how contradictions are not possible to be sublated in societal unities, all three of them disregard the effect on the other end of the question: if antagonisms or revolts are found to be permanent, then problems which antagonisms contain, or which revolts address, become permanent as well. In contrast, Theodor W. Adornos’ understanding (...) of societal antagonisms is that while social contradictions point towards the falsity of the whole and therefore must be acknowledged critically, they should not be considered unhistorical and permanent. This article aims at showing how Mouffe, Žižek and Kristeva end up in essentializing antagonisms and offers Adorno’s notion of antagonism as an alternative. (shrink)