According to Foucault, power in modern society is diffuse and pervasive, and works through the agency of free subjects. Its imperatives are internalized by indi­viduals who become self-disciplined, are tied to a particular identity, and govern their own behavior accordingly. Drawing on recent insights from neuroscience, the whole process of norm internalization can be seen as an expression of “neuropower” and a form of “neuropolitics” through which social and power relations become ingrained not just in human bodies and minds, but (...) also in human brains. In recent decades, this process has been partly reversed as a result of the proliferation of information technologies and the electronic media. (shrink)

According to Foucault, power in modern society is diffuse and pervasive, and works through the agency of free subjects. Its imperatives are internalized by indi­viduals who become self-disciplined, are tied to a particular identity, and govern their own behavior accordingly. Drawing on recent insights from neuroscience, the whole process of norm internalization can be seen as an expression of “neuropower” and a form of “neuropolitics” through which social and power relations become ingrained not just in human bodies and minds, but (...) also in human brains. In recent decades, this process has been partly reversed as a result of the proliferation of information technologies and the electronic media. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe schism between positivism and interpretivism in the social sciences is usually explained by the explicit epistemological and methodological commitments of social scientists and philosophers. It can be better understood, though, as a collision between two contrasting cognitive modes and sensibilities, rooted in the predominant recruitment of two distinct networks in the human brain. Since the activation of these networks is negatively correlated, the analytic reasoning typical of positivists and the empathetic, intuitive, and holistic thinking employed by intepretivists produce incommensurate (...) versions of social reality. The analytic cognitive mode is fostered and privileged in complex modern societies and in institutionalized social-science research. It is nevertheless inadequate for understanding the social world, as it facilitates the modeling of causal interactions between inanimate objects. (shrink)