4 found
Order:
  1.  54
    For-Itself and in-Itself in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.John M. Moreland - 1973 - Philosophy Today 17 (4):311-318.
    It is argued that in beginning ``being and nothingness'' with the absolute ontological distinction between the for-itself (pure nothingness) and the in-itself (pure being), sartre makes it impossible to understand how the phenomenological account of experience which comes later in the work could be correct. attention is paid almost entirely to the critique of sartre implicit in the chapter of merleau-ponty's ``phenomenology of perception'' titled 'the cogito'. merleau-ponty's divergence from sartre is seen to center around his critique of sartre on (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  11
    Mental Images: A Defence. Alastair Hannay.John M. Moreland - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (1):96-98.
  3. For-Itself and In-Itself In Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.John M. Moreland - 1973 - Phil Today 17:311-318.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Projectibility and Randomness.John M. Moreland - 1973 - Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark