Much of modern ethics is built around the idea that we should respect one another’s autonomy. Here, “we” are typically imagined to be adult human beings of sound mind, where the soundness of our mind is measured against what we take to be the typical mental capacities of a neurodevelopmentally “normal” person—perhaps in their mid-thirties or forties. When deciding about what constitutes ethical sex, for example, our dominant models hold that ethical sex is whatever is consented to, while a lack (...) of consent makes sex wrong.1 Consent, in turn, is analysed in terms of autonomous decision-making: a “yes” or “no” that reflects the free and informed will of our idealised, sound-minded adult. Whether such models provide adequate normative guidance for ethical, much less good, sex between neurotypical human adults is an open question.2 3 When it comes to the ethics of sexual activity between humans and non-humans—robots, say—or between humans who don’t fit the rational stereotype, we hardly know where to begin.4–7 It is therefore heartening to see a number of papers in this issue tackling the difficult question how to respectfully facilitate or respond to the needs, desires, and decisions of people with different kinds or degrees of autonomy.8 For example, Sumytra Menon and colleagues9 explicitly discuss the notion of “borderline capacity” and argue, in the medical domain, for shared and supportive decision-making practices to “foster the autonomy of patients with compromised mental capacity while being mindful of the need to safeguard their well-being.” Touching on a similar theme, Zahra Ladan 10 asks how we should conceive of liberty in the case of persons with certain inborn physical or mental limitations. Might it sometimes be necessary to …. (shrink)

Nondirectiveness is widely regarded as an important principle of genetic counseling. However, numerous studies have indicated that the use of this principle and its content itself are subject to controversies. The present study aimed to verify how the nondirectiveness principle is defined by Polish geneticists, the extent to which it is considered the main principle in clinical practice, and the situations in which geneticists see the positive value of the directive action. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, the study compared the (...) abstract declarations of the directiveness validity and the scope of this principle with the declaration of action in situations close to reality (case scenarios). The results showed that the high rank assigned to the nondirectiveness principle does not translate into the conviction about the absolute obligation to use it in clinical practice. Polish geneticists are inclined to restrict the scope of patients’ choices when these are outside of their definition of medical standard. Strong medical paternalism manifests itself particularly in invasive prenatal diagnostics, where geneticists play the role of gatekeepers. In this study, we offer hypotheses about the sources of these attitudes by analyzing the current cultural and legal context of Poland. (shrink)

Recenzja J. Haidt, Prawy umysł. Dlaczego dobrych ludzi dzieli religia i polityka?, przeł. Agnieszka Nowak-Młynikowska, Sopot, Smak Słowa 2014, 447 str.

This article analyzes the scientific debate surrounding the appropriateness of pharmacological interventions aimed at increasing female desire. It has three objectives: (1) to outline the nonepistemic values that underlie scientific concepts of desire; (2) to conduct an analysis of scientific misuses when justifying a drive-based model of desire and pharmacological intervention; and (3) to show how in this and similar cases of vague constructs we can demonstrate the role of nonepistemic values and assess their influence.