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  1.  37
    An Inquiry Into the Principles of Needs-Based Allocation of Health Care.Tony Hope, Lars Peter Østerdal & Andreas Hasman - 2010 - Bioethics 24 (9):470-480.
    The concept of need is often proposed as providing an additional or alternative criterion to cost-effectiveness in making allocation decisions in health care. If it is to be of practical value it must be sufficiently precisely characterized to be useful to decision makers. This will require both an account of how degree of need for an intervention is to be determined and a prioritization rule that clarifies how degree of need and the cost of the intervention interact in determining the (...)
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  2.  11
    Health Care Need: Three Interpretations.Andreas Hasman, Tony Hope & Lars Peter Østerdal - 2006 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (2):145–156.
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  3.  33
    Pascal's and Tabarrok's Wagers.Lars Peter Østerdal - 2004 - Theory and Decision 57 (1):1-4.
    In a recent paper A. Tabarrok [Believe in Pascal’s Wager? Have I Got a Deal for You!, Theory and Decision 48, 123--128, 2000] argued that a believer who accepts Pascal’s Wager should in addition accept payment of any given fee in return for a given increase in the probability of reaching God. However the conclusion is obtained from manipulations of infinities which are not valid in an expected utility model. In this note, an alternative model is formulated in which Tabarrok’s (...)
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    Equal Value of Life and the Pareto Principle.Andreas Hasman & Lars Peter Østerdal - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):19-33.
    A principle claiming equal entitlement to continued life has been strongly defended in the literature as a fundamental social value. We refer to this principle as ‘equal value of life'. In this paper we argue that there is a general incompatibility between the equal value of life principle and the weak Pareto principle and provide proof of this under mild structural assumptions. Moreover we demonstrate that a weaker, age-dependent version of the equal value of life principle is also incompatible with (...)
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