The Twelve Member States agreed in December 1991 in Maastricht on an EconomicMonetary Union, including a single currency and an autonomous European central bank by the turn of the century, and on "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe". The structure of the European Political Union resembles a temple with three pillars : more powers for the European Parliament on a wider ranger of policy issues, a separate framework for a common foreign and security policy, and intergovernmental cooperation (...) on justice and internal aff airs. The new Treaty wilt replace the Treaty of Rome only after ratification in all twelve member states. White EMU and EPU dominated the public agenda, the internal market programme was drawing to a close with nearly all White paper measures adopted. Emphasis shifted to implementation problems. The prolonged conflict between Commission, Parliament and Council on the 1992 budget gave a taste of increasing tensions on budgetary issues, especially between "northern" and "southern" interests. That divide wilt deepen with or without ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The budgetary battle of 1991 was partly on external relations. The external activities of the EC were all but successful in 1991: disparate conduct in the Gulf War, failure to contain conflict in Yugoslavia, near-collapse of negotiations with the EFTA countries, deadlock in Gatt-talks and the threat of a trade war between the three trade blocks. Ibe European Common Agricultural Policy remained a major stumblingblock in the Gatt-talks. The Commission proposed a radical reform package for CAP, fiercely opposed by France until the end of the year. (shrink)

The classical "western" model of modernization assumes that economie development in the end will lead to a more uniform world of political democracies in free market economies. However, this western model turns out to be too deterministic for non-western countries.A selective review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the question learns that the western model runs into problems because it does not make a clear distinction between preconditions for political democratization and demands posed by modernization. Empirical studies show, contrary (...) to the western model logic, that there is no direct positive relationship between economie growth and political democratization. Cultural and structural thresholds may inhibit democratization : an intolerant culture, absence of a free market economy, external influences, a history of constantly wavering political regimes. As concerns the demands posed by modernization, modern political regimes tend to develop common characteristics, one of them being the design ofmore participatory structures and procedures. But there is no theoretical evidence whatsoever of the western model being the final destination for all modernizing societies. (shrink)

A scheme of analysis for separatism is proposed. Its purpose is twofold: to indicate the essential factors in a separatist process, and to explain the waves of active and « dead » separatist activity.The central idea is the distinction between three dimensions in the separatist process : conflict, mobilization and collective action. Both dimension on its own is determined by certain factors. Conflict depends on contradictions of identity and interest structure between people and nation. Mobilization is primarily a function of (...) the social, economic and political opportunities of the people as against the nation. Collective action is the result of the presence, strength and behaviour of the elite and social movement in people and nation.Evolution from one dimension to the next one depends upon the factors of the dimensions involved and on a) the policy of the nation and b) the societal changes caused by the modernization process.Finally one can explain inactive and active periods by verifying the presence or absence of these nine factors. It seems then that there are false and real « dead » periods, and that some separatist activity has a sound basis white other has not. (shrink)

The democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, the speedy unification process of the two Germanies, growing economic disarray in the Soviet Union and the Gulf War put great pressure on the European Community - and raised high expectations throughout 1990. The external challenges initially seemed to slow down the internal integration process. But by the end of 1990 the Twelve committed themselves to further European political union and European economic union culminating into a central bank and a common currency. The two (...) intergovernmental constitutional conferences on EPU and EMU were installed on December 15. The execution of the internal market programme is on schedule with 70% of the directives adopted by late 1990, although the Commission expressed concern about timely transposition of the directives into national law. The EC's record on external relations is mixed : appreciation for its stepped-up cooperation with Eastern Europe, criticism for its tough stand on agriculture at the Gatt-conference, weak diplomatie performance during the Gulf War. (shrink)

Despite major institutional and political changes in the Belgian political system in the last 25 years, the electoral organization has been very stable.The adaptations of the electoral organization have even been less in the province of Brabant, although the politica! developments have caused there additional problems. Brabant's electoral constituencies contain a rather strange mixture of heterogeneous electorates : a constituency, which consists of the bilingual capital Brussels as welt as several Flemish communes, a unilingual Walloon constituency, a unilingual Flemish constituency. (...) The proposed solutions for Brabant's complex situation can be summarized into six alternative systems of electoral organization, concentrating either on the functioning of the system of provincial allotment, or on a radical redrawing of the boundaries of the electoral constituencies.The impact of the six alternatives on the seats distribution among the political parties is rather restricted. The shifts of seats inside the parties are more striking than between the parties. Alternatives IV and VI cause the largest reallocation of seats between the parties, whereas alternatives II, III and V result in only minor changes. (shrink)