Order:
See also
Mark Douglas Saward
Monash University
  1.  87
    Collins' Core Fine-Tuning Argument.Mark Douglas Saward - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (2):209-222.
    Collins (The Blackwell companion to natural theology, 2009) presents an argument he calls the ‘core fine-tuning argument’. In this paper, I show that Collins’ argument is flawed in at least two ways. First, the structure, depending on likelihoods, fails to establish anything about the posterior probability of God’s existence given fine-tuning. As an argument for God’s existence, this is a serious failing. Second, his analysis of what is appropriately restricted background knowledge, combined with the credences of a specially chosen ‘alien’, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2.  61
    Fine-Tuning as Evidence for a Multiverse: Why White is Wrong. [REVIEW]Mark Douglas Saward - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):243-253.
    Roger White (God and design, Routledge, London, 2003) claims that while the fine-tuning of our universe, $\alpha $ , may count as evidence for a designer, it cannot count as evidence for a multiverse. First, I will argue that his considerations are only correct, if at all, for a limited set of multiverses that have particular features. As a result, I will argue that his claim cannot be generalised as a statement about all multiverses. This failure to generalise, I will (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  6
    The Problem of Invoking Infinite Polytheisms: A Response to Raphael Lataster and Herman Philipse.Mark Douglas Saward - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 82 (3):289-298.
    Raphael Lataster and Herman Philipse present an argument which they think decisively demonstrates polytheism over monotheism, if theism is assumed. Far from being decisive, the argument depends on very controversial and likely false assumptions about how to treat infinities in probability. Moreover, these problems are well known. Here, we focus on three objections. First, the authors rely on both countable additivity and the Principle of Indifference, which contradict each other. Second, the authors rely on a particular way of dividing up (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography