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  1.  91
    The Ratio Bias Phenomenon: Fact or Artifact? [REVIEW]Mathieu Lefebvre, Ferdinand M. Vieider & Marie Claire Villeval - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (4):615-641.
    The ratio bias—according to which individuals prefer to bet on probabilities expressed as a ratio of large numbers to normatively equivalent or superior probabilities expressed as a ratio of small numbers—has recently gained momentum, with researchers especially in health economics emphasizing the policy importance of the phenomenon. Although the bias has been replicated several times, some doubts remain about its economic significance. Our two experiments show that the bias disappears once order effects are excluded, and once salient and dominant incentives (...)
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  2. The Ratio Bias Phenomenon : Fact or Artifact ?Mathieu Lefebvre, Ferdinand Vieider & Marie-Claire Villeval - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (4).
    The ratio bias––according to which individuals prefer to bet on probabilities expressed as a ratio of large numbers to normatively equivalent or superior probabilities expressed as a ratio of small numbers––has recently gained momentum, with researchers especially in health economics emphasizing the policy importance of the phenomenon. Although the bias has been replicated several times, some doubts remain about its economic significance. Our two experiments show that the bias disappears once order effects are excluded, and once salient and dominant incentives (...)
     
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  3.  97
    Reining in Excessive Risk-Taking by Executives: The Effect of Accountability. [REVIEW]Mathieu Lefebvre & Ferdinand M. Vieider - 2013 - Theory and Decision 75 (4):497-517.
    Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk-taking in agents that is excessive from the point of view of the company or the shareholders. We test whether increasing shareholder control may be an effective checking mechanism to rein in such excessive risk-taking. We thus tell one group of experimental CEOs that they may have to justify their decision-making processes in front of their shareholders. This indeed reduces risk-taking and increases the performance of the companies they manage. Implications are (...)
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