Bernard Suits is commonly thought to have defined games as challenges. This paper argues that Suits could not have done so without ruining his larger philosophical project. It then argues that he did not do so. Suits defined game playing in quantitative terms (i.e. being more or less efficient) not qualitative ones (e.g. difficulty, struggle). The paper concludes by exploring the consequences of this shift in perspective.

Johnson and Hudecki argue that Bernard Suits fails to refute Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ view of games because Suits’s account of how games begin, how they are played, and the ends they involve, fails to match basic facts of player experience. In reply, the current paper describes three keys to interpreting The Grasshopper: (1) distinguishing the four perspectives from which Suits describes games, (2) recognizing Suits' dispositional view of rule following, and (3) understanding the geometrical metaphor Suits uses to describe rules. (...) In light of these, this paper argues that Johnson and Hudecki’s critiques are either mistaken or are actually affirmations of Suits' position. (shrink)

This article examines the philosophical work of Dallas Willard, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California. After outlining his major translations, it explores four of Willard’s central theses: that Husserl’s phenomenology of knowledge solved a fundamental puzzle about the objectivity of knowledge; that the success of Husserlian phenomenology’s account of knowledge depended upon Husserl’s ontological insights; that Husserl was already a phenomenologist when Frege was purportedly converting him from psychologism; and that Husserl maintained his early account of (...) knowledge—and thus his realism—throughout his career. Though Willard was instrumental in starting the “Early” or “Realist Phenomenology” movement in America, his philosophical contributions have yet to be fully explored. Therefore, the paper concludes with a guide to those who would like to understand and develop Willard’s work further. (shrink)

Plato’s Euthyphro presents a puzzle about priority: is deity prior to morality, or vice versa? A Neoplatonic solution identifies God with the Good, claiming the dilemma to be illusory. If we treat the orders of being and power as distinct, however, the God of Genesis 1 may seem to be prior in one order, while goodness is prior in the other; the picture becomes complex, with the various senses of priority apparently balancing out. Without being either Neoplatonic or following other (...) ancient theologies, therefore, Genesis 1 challenges Plato’s dichotomy, highlighting the potential for finding philosophical resources in theological texts. (shrink)

This article argues that philosophers tend to employ a particular method in constructing their theories and critiquing their opponents. To substantiate this claim, the article examines the work of Nietzsche and Locke, the Empiricists and Rationalists, Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida, and Russell and Wittgenstein, showing how each relies on a method the article labels “revolution-through-return.” The method consists in identifying the authority behind your opponent's theory, then appealing to something “prior to” that authority, from which you then proceed to derive (...) your own theory. The article distinguishes between several senses of priority, argues that modern philosophers tend to rely on temporal priority, and discusses the questions in priority theory that need to be addressed in order evaluate and construct revolution-through-return arguments. (shrink)