This paper sets out to analyze how causation works by focusing on biology, as represented by epidemiology and by scientific information on how the body works (“physiology”). It starts by exploring the specificity of evolved physiological systems, in which evolutionary, developmental and proximal causes all fit together, and the concept of function is meaningful; in contrast, this structure does not apply in epidemiology (or outside biology). Using these two contrasting branches of biology, I examine the role both of mechanism and (...) of difference making in causation. I find that causation necessarily involves both mechanism and difference making, and that they play complementary roles. Both are seen as ontologically necessary, even if the evidence is not always available for both. Influential monist accounts that focus on one of these, at the expense of ignoring the other, are found to be inadequate on these and on other grounds. Recent attempts to combine them are reviewed, notably that of Russo and Williamson (Int Stud Philos Sci 21:157–170, 2007), and it is argued that their epistemic view requires there to be a source of the different types of evidence that a rational agent would consider, and that this source must be ontic. I then analyze how causal relationships work in evolved physiological systems and in those studied by epidemiology, with a particular focus on how mechanism interacts with input. Finally, I consider this concept of causation from the perspective of everyday language, and of its possible generalisability outside biology. (shrink)

This chapter compares biology with the practices of economics to determine the extent to which mainstream economic theory can be regarded as ‘scientific’. This survey of practice in the two disciplines shows that biological theory is derived from description and experimentation. In contrast, the ideal in mainstream economics is to derive theory from axioms. When economic theory is compared with the available evidence, a disjunction is found between the empirical findings and conventional theory. The disjunction is explained by a fundamental (...) mismatch between the evidence and the basic theoretical categories and structure. The central issue is the relationship of evidence to theory: to put it simply, which should come first? The conclusion is that regularities that emerge from a comparative historical perspective, including use of econometric, statistical, and qualitative studies, could provide the type of evidence that could form a secure foundation for theorising in economics. (shrink)