Carrying out analyses performed on the provisions of “Pre-Islamic Divine Laws”, which is described as the religious provisions introduced by the prophets before Prophet Muhammad is one of the questions of debate in Shafiī Sect. The reason laying out of this controversy is based on the question, whether the provisions enunciated via the prophets before the Prophet Muhammad are recognized within the legal aspect, or not. On the other hand, there is no controversy between the procedural, on non-binding for Muslims, (...) about of the previous divine communiqués, which are not mentioned in the Qur’ānor the sunnah, and previous divine messages with evidence that they were abolished despite their presence in these two sources. In the same way, there is no debate about the fact that the provisions of the previous divine religions that were in force for Muslims, such as fasting, also remained in force for Muslims. In this case, with taking part in the Qur’ān or the sunnah, the provisions that there is no evidence about whether they abolished or not, it is debated that they are for Muslims binding or not.In this study, our objective is to carry out analyses and researches on the methodological conceptions of Imam Shafiī and Shafiī lawmen with regards to Pre-Islamic Divine Laws, which have no evidence for being retained in force or being abolished for Muslims despite being mentioned in the Qur’ān or the sunnah, as well as on the level of theoretical conceptions of these scribes being put into practice within the scope of fiqh examples.SummaryIt is a must to identify the scope of Pre-Islamic Divine Laws (Sharia Man Qablanā) [shariah of those before us], which is discussed in terms of being recognized as a shariah evidence by the Shafiī lawmen before analzying the opinions of Shafiī Sect followers. Yet, setting forth the opinions in a healthy manner is based on the identification of the question of debate. Within this context, it is a must to draw up the lines and borders in what the Shafiī lawmen / lawyer and canonists / judiciary mean by the term “Pre-Islamic Divine Laws (Sharia Man Qablanā)” in order to designate the practical results of methodological discussions on Pre-Islamic Divine Laws.Sharia Man Qablanā, of which lexical meaning is “shariah of those before us” is defined in fiqh as follows: “These are the religious provisions acquainted by the prophets before Prophet Muhammad”. In fact, this definition can be categorized as “general” in terms of the evidential value of Sharia Man Qablanā. In that, since it is not possible to carry out an analysis on the reliability of the informational value in the previous divine notices, which cannot be conferred neither in the Holy Qur’ān and the sunnah, each and every lawmen and canonists, including those recognizing Sharia Man Qablanā as hujjat (proof), have come to an agreement that the early divine notices that are not mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān and sunnah will not be recognized in terms of its informational value for Muslims, thus being besides the mark to discuss its validity and bindingness. In this case, the outlines of Sharia Man Qablanā, as controversial in terms of its hujjat value, must be specified. Belonging the earlier divine religions as per the works of lawmen, Sharia Man Qablanā is subjected to a categorization of four part with regard to provisions mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān or the sunnah, whether they are recognized as hujjat by Muslims. 1. The provisions that are not mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān or the sunnah, yet being mentioned only in the earlier monotheistic revelations. The fiqh lawmen have come to an agreement that these provisions are not binding for Muslims, and even that it is not permissible to act in accordance with these provisions. Because, there is no certain information on whether these provisions are reliable.2. The earlier divine notices, which have been proven to be nullified for Muslims, despite being mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān or the sunnah. Since these divine notices have lost their validity, there is a consensus among Muslims that they are not recognized as hujjat. The following hadith is shown as an example as of from the sunnah for this part “Pillage was not halal to those before me, but not it is halal to me” (Muslim, “Masājid”, 56). In that, this hadith indicates that prohibition with regards to the pillage, which was not permissible to the earlier ummahs (nations), is not recognized by Muslims. Thus, rendering pillage as not halal cannot be attributed to Muslims. 3. The provisions of earlier divine religions, which remained in force about Muslims. The canonists exemplify this matter with “fasting”. It can be understood from the verse “O ye who believe! Fasting is prescribed to you as it was prescribed to those before you, that ye may (learn) self-restraint.” (al-Baqara 2/183) that the fasting was a provision as prescribed for the earlier ummahs, which remained in force for Muslims as well. There is no controversy on the matter that fasting is prescribed for Muslims too, as it can be clearly seen from the verse. The hadith of the Prophet Muhammad “It (sacrificing an animal for God) is the sunnah from your Ancestor Ibrahim” (Ibn Majah, “Adāhi”, 3) can be shown as an example that sacrificing an animal for god is applicable to Muslims as well. As a matter of fact, this hadith attests that sacrificing an animal for god is applicable to Muslims, as it is in the religion of the Prophet Ibrahim. 4. The provisions from earlier divine religions, which have no evidence whether they were revoked or remaimed in force for Muslims. The canonists cannot find any evidence for the provisions with regards to the alternative utilization of something between the partners to be recognized as applicable for Muslims within the scope of the following verses: “Here is a she-camel: she has a right of watering, and ye have a right of watering, (severally) on a day appointed” (al-Shu‘ara 26/155) and “And tell them that the water is to be divided between them: Each one's right to drink being brought forward (by suitable turns)” (al-Qamar 54/28). Similarly, there is no evidence that the provisions concerning the retailation, as prescribed in Torah, whether they remained in force or were revoked, as it can be seen in the verse “We ordained therein for them: "Life for life, eye for eye, nose or nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth, and wounds equal for equal” (al-Ma’ida 5/45). (shrink)

Sunnah is the second main source for Islamic law following the Qur’ān. Sunnah in the books on the Methodology of Islamic Law (Usūl al-fiqh) is examined in two main parts, one of which is as the source for religious commands and the other is being as religious/taklīfī commands. Sunnah is divided into three categories in terms of being the source for Islamic commands: qawlī (verbal), fi‘ilī (behavioral) and taqrīrī (approval). In the Islamic literature, when the word “sunnah” is mentioned, first (...) of all, it is understood as a verbal appeal, which is qawlī sunnah (hadith). Verbal sunnah has a rhetoric/wording that includes demand (amr/order-nahy/prohibition) or freedom (mubāḥ). And ultimately to the wording of this verbal address, some religious commands, such as farḍ/wājib, sunnah/mandūb, and permissible/mubāḥ are attributed. The behavioral sunnah (the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad), on the other hand, does not have a rhetoric that includes demand (amr/order-nahy/prohibition) or freedom (mubāḥ). The command/judgment is based on rhetoric. In other words, if there is an address, there is a command; if there is no address, there is no command/judgment. Therefore, it is problematic that the acts of the Prophet are decreed in the form of farḍ/ wājib, sun-nah/mandūb and mubāḥ. For this reason, the acts of the Prophet in the books on the Method-ology of Islamic Law (Usūl al-fiqh) have been particularly examined under the title of Afʿāl al-Rasūl. While some of the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad have a religious character, some of them are the acts that he performed completely in accordance with the customs and traditions in the society he lived in. Therefore, not all of the Prophet’s deeds/acts (behavioral sunnah) are at the same level in terms of obligation. Therefore, while some of the acts/deeds of the Prophet express wucūb, some other mandūb (sunnah-mustaḥab) and still some other ibāhā/mubāḥ. On the other hand, the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad, in terms of being the source of religious commands, are divided into two categories: the tashrīī (religiously) qualified and non tashrīī (religiously) qualified. What is meant by a religious act is the actions of the Prophet, which he performed as being a prophet, for the purpose of worshiping and that he wanted his followers act accordingly. What is meant by a non-religious act is the behavior of the Prophet as a human being or as a requirement of the society he lived in. Sunnah, in terms of being a religious com-mand, refers to commands other than fard and wājib. Ḥanafī scholars are of the opinion that sunnah as a religious decree is divided into two parts as sunnah-i hudā and sunnah-i zawāid. The acts of the Prophet, in accordance with his being a human or the custom of the society he lived in, are included in the scope of sunnah zawāid. In other words, sunnah zawāid generally means the actions of the Prophet that he did not do with the intention of worship. In this con-text, the acts of the Prophet Muḥammad are important. Because, the acts of the Prophet are not the same in terms of qualification (command), nor are they the same in terms of their nature (being religious or humanly natural). The acts of the Prophet Muḥammad with a religious nature are divided into two as known qualities and unknown qualifications. In principle, the religious acts of the Prophet, whose qualities are known, are also obligation for the ummah (Muslims). Therefore, when it is known for what purpose the Prophet Muḥammad made a deed/behavior, that act is accordingly is binding for the ummah (Muslims). Accordingly, if the attribute of a deed/behavior made by the Prophet is wājib/farḍ, it is also wājib for the ummah and permissible (ibāḥā) for the ummah if it is permissible. On the other hand, the acts of the Prophet in the Qur’ān as a mujmal (ambiguous nass /verse) are also subject to the command of mujmal. There is a dispute regarding the verdict of the Prophet’s acts of religious nature whose qualifications are unknown. According to the majority of Hanafī scholars, what is essential in the actions of the Prophet whose qualifications are unknown and that contain the characteris-tics of worship, is that it is mustahab/mandūb. According to Kerkhī (d. 340/952), what is es-sential in such deeds/behaviors is that it is permissible. Jassās (d.370 / 980) expresses the same opinion with Kerkhī. Opinions on this issue are conveyed from Imām Mālik and Imām Shafiī that he declared permissibility. The preferred opinion in Hanbalis is to declare permissibility. Non-religious acts of the Prophet Muḥammad as a human being or as per the custom of the society he lives in are not obligation for the ummah. Therefore, what is essential in such deeds/behaviors is that it is permissible. (shrink)

Ribā/interest is one of the prominent regulations in Islam regarding commercial life. The commercial lives of Muslims and laws related to commerce were regulated in accordance with the prohibition of ribā, and by this a society that avoided ribā with sensitivity was created in practice. This sensitivity about ribā manifested in the principle that the suspicion of ribā is evaluated as ribā, and it is ruled as haram like riba. In fiqh sources, besides issues regarding ribā, issues involving suspicion of (...) ribā were also mentioned, and some rulings were justified with the presence of suspicion of riba. However, the logic of using the concept of ribā suspicion in fiqh sources may vary from case to case: the reasoning behind the use of riba suspicion in one case may not fit into another case, and thus a completely different reasoning of ribā suspicion may appear in another case. To clarify the framework of the concept of ribā suspicion, it would be noteworthy to study these each of the uses in the classical fiqh sources. The purpose of this article is to examine the use of the concept of ribā suspicion based on the cases in the Ḥanafī sources. Methodologically, first, the cases in which the concept of ribā suspicion is used are determined. Secondly, the reasoning made for each example is examined by considering the contextual framework of the case. Lastly, these uses are classified and presented to the reader with examples. The principle of evaluating “the suspicion of ribā like ribā” in Islamic law is indeed related to the rule of considering “any suspicion as certainty when it comes to harams or in matters where precaution is substantial”. Since ribā is a haram that Muslims should meticulously avoid, and therefore requires caution, its suspicion is subject to the same rulings as ribā itself. In the Hanafi fiqh books, the concept of suspicion of ribā is mostly referred in the following cases: - Not knowing whether there is equality between the subject matters in barter transactions where equality is stipulated. For example, when exchanging two batches of the same kind of ribawi goods, though quantities are unknown. - It is not known whether tariq al-itibār has taken place in changes that may be permissible through tariq al-itibār. For example, in the exchange of a silver-embroidered sword with silver, if the amount of silver in the ornamented part is not known, the suspicion of ribā arises. - The emergence of a situation similar to ribā because of a transaction that is normally permissible: While there are two legitimate sales in Bay' al-inah, the conclusion of being the same as an interest bearing loan is considered as ribā suspicion. - When the case has two different sides; from one side the act is ribā, but from other side it is not. For example, in the case of salam contract of ribawi goods, if goods of different quality are brought during delivery and the quality difference is requested from the customer; suspicion of ribā arises. Apart from these uses in the Hanafi fiqh books, it is seen that the concept of ribā suspicion is employed to prove an opinion disputed between schools of Islamic law. For example, to argue that ribā rules are also valid for goods sold by piece (adadiyyāt) or by length measures (zirāiyyāt), the Hanafis say that one of the two causes (illah) of ribā is found in the exchange of these goods by type, and the suspicion of ribā arises with just a single cause (illah). On the other hand, the Shafiis use the concept of suspicion of ribā to argue that determining the subjects (ta’yin) in the exchange of ribavi goods other than gold and silver is not sufficient. Another use of the term emerges because of the authors' preference for a cautious language. Some authors acted cautiously on some cases that were normally ribā and were described by other authors in this manner, and used the term "ribā suspicion" instead of ribā; probably as they both require the same ruling (harām). Another wrongly used (in our opinion) is the use of “suspicion of ribā” in some cases that are actually considered only as disliked acts (makruh). (shrink)

As mentioned in the narrations, the messenger of Allah (pbuh) used to recite some prayers known as opening prayers such as Subhaneke, Wejjehtu and Allâhümme Bâid before reciting Fatiha surah while starting the obligatory and supererogatory worships (salat). In this study, it is aimed to find out the reflections of the abovementioned prayers in narrations, and to determine their authenticity and to reveal the reasons why jurisprudential sects preferred different prayers. Benefitting from literature review method, hadith inferences were made, and (...) moving from the books of refutation & corrections and biographies, the cases of the narrators of the hadiths, who took part in the ascription of the narrations, were put forth. After the investigation, it was determined that the narrated narrations about Subhaneke, an opening prayer, were found to have been narrated by eight different prophet companions in their later works through Aisha and Abu Sâ’id al-Khudrî in early hadiths resources; and that all these narrations were week in terms of authenticity. However, it was revealed that the most authentic narrations about the issue were those depending on the practice of Umar. In the hadith resources, it was seen that five different prophet companions narrated some narrations about the Wejjechtu prayer, and that the great majority of these narrations were through Ali, and that most of these narrations were authentic, yet only one reference was found to be weak. On the other hand, it was revealed that the narrations narrated by Abu Huraira between the opening prayer, Allâhümme Bâid, turned out to be genuine in terms of authenticity. For instance, while Hanafis and Hanbalis have preferred reciting Subhaneke during salat, Shafiîs have found it appropriate to recite the prayer Wejjectu in the salat. On the other hand, Malikis have thought that it was obligatory to start the salat with Surah Fatiha, and that it was makruh to recite these prayers in salat. (shrink)

``I am therefore I have rights," argues this paper. Mere existence qualifies a human being for universal human rights. Yet human beings do not live in solitude; they are always embedded in a network of social relations which determines their rights and duties in its own terms. Consequently, the debate about the universality and relativism of human rights can be best understood by combining legal and sociological perspectives. Such an approach is used in this article to explore the tensions and (...) contests around the universality of human rights in Islamic law. Whether all human beings or just citizens are qualified for the inviolability of human rights is a question which divided Muslim jurists into two schools: Universalistic School, emanating from Abu Hanifa, advocated for the universality of human rights, while Communalistic School, originating from Malik, Shafii and Ibn Hanbal, advocated for civil rights. Universalistic School was adopted by such great cosmopolitan empires as Umayyads, Abbasids, Mughals and Ottomans. It was also reformed by the Ottomans during the nineteenth century in the light of the new notions of universal human rights in Europe to purge remaining discriminatory practices against non-Muslim citizens and to justify constitutionalism and democracy. Yet the universalistic tradition in Islamic law has been forgotten as the chain of memory was broken after the collapse of Ottoman Empire. This article briefly unearths the forgotten universalistic approach in Islamic law to build upon it a modern universalistic human rights theory for which there is a pressing need at this age of globalization. (shrink)

It is well-known that Ibn al-Salāh al-Shahrazūrī (d. 643/1245) has an important place in the field of hadith methodology. In this context, it is possible to see Ibn-al Salah’s influence in a large proportion of the hadith terminology. The fact that the term ḥasan was not substantially included in the hadith method studies before Ibn-al Salah and that this concept became widely known in the field after him led to study the contributions of al Salah on the subject of ḥasan (...) hadith and in this regard, his effect on the term ḥasan. As result it was found that authorities such as Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), ʿAlī b. al-Madīnī (d. 234/848-49), Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241/855) used the concept of ḥasan in various meanings before al-Tirmidhī (d. 279/892) who, according to general acceptance, made the term ḥasan famous for its terminological use. However, it is possible to say that ʿAlī b. al-Madīnī was the first to use the terminological meaning of the concept ḥasan. Actually, the fact that Shafii’ used the term ḥasan isnād for an authentic hadith that al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) and Muslim b. Ḥajjāj (d. 261/875) would later unanimously narrate, and Ahmad b. Hanbal used ḥasan as gharib, is evidence for the unsystematic use of the term in the early periods. Even though, thanks to al-Tirmidhī, an important place was opened for the concept in riwāya literature, there was no serious mention of the term in later hadith methodology. Therefore, it has been seen that hadith scholars considered the term ḥasan within the scope of ṣaḥīḥ or ḍaʻīf hadith, since they accepted the term as an intermediate concept, and for this reason they did not include the term ḥasan among the subjects of hadith methodology until Ibn al-Salāh. An examination of the argument, that one can act upon a ḍaʻīf hadith, would show that ḥasan hadith might have been interpreted within the scope of ḍaʻīf hadith. On the other hand, the fact that some scholars such as Mughulṭāy b. Qilīj (d. 762/1361) state that a hadith would be called ṣaḥīḥ if it is maqbūl with any presumption, and that there is no point in calling such a hadith ḥasan shows that the ḥasan hadith is considered within the scope of ṣaḥīḥ hadith. The fact that hadith methodology scholars did not mention ḥasan hadith before Ibn al-Salāh stems from the ambiguity of the subject. Contrary to his predecessors, Ibn al-Salāh tried to save the term ḥasan from its ambiguity by combining the different specifications put forward by al-Tirmidhī, al-Khaṭṭābī (d. 388/998), and Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201). The specifications and interpretations of the term presented by Ibn al-Salāh via his meticulous efforts, have also been adopted by his successors. The term ḥasan hadith has gained an important place in the literature of hadith methodology thanks to the views and definitions built on the descriptions and interpretations of Ibn al-Salāh. In this context, while there are those who agree with Ibn al-Salāh’s descriptions and evaluations of the term, there are also those who criticize his remarks on the subject. However, it has been seen that those who criticize Ibn al-Salāh, along with those who follow him, criticized him by following the path drawn by Ibn al-Salāh. Based on this and similar situations, it was concluded that not only the descriptions and comments that Ibn al-Salāh made, but also his style and methods of handling the subject gave direction to the studies on hadith methodology. In addition, it has been observed that the most compact description of the term ḥasan is put forward by Ibn Hajar and today’s studies are predicated on his description. Within this framework, after emphasizing that there are four degrees of maqbūl hadiths, Ibn Hajar defined the two fields, which were covered by two different descriptions of Ibn al-Salāh, as ḥasan li-zatih and lighairih by Ibn al-Ḥajar. (d. 852/1449) By doing so Ibn al-Ḥajar gave the final shape to the ḥasan hadith terms. He also captured the fundamental point where ḥasan hadith differs from the ṣaḥīḥ hadith because the basic point in question, which was not directly stated before, is a slight flaw in the narrator’s grip. At the end of the study, it was concluded that -as al-Dhahabi (d. 748/1348) also stated- it does not seem possible to determine a comprehensive rule that gathers ḥasan hadiths under a single description. Considering the historical context of the term ḥasan, it has been observed that the most effective description of the ḥasan hadith are the terms ḥasan li-zatih and ḥasan lighairih, which were put forward by Ibn Hajar by transforming the dual division mentioned by Ibn al-Salāh into a more understandable form. (shrink)

Understanding the nusus and the interpretation of their texts has been at the center of the activities of many schools and ulama in fiqh studies, and as a result, each school of usool has sought to find a method suitable for their own understanding in order to understand and interpret the nusus in a sahih way. For this purpose, fiqh schools have developed some unique methods. It can be said that the main differences among the hukms that fiqh schools rely (...) on are generally due to these methodological differences. One of the efforts to understand and interpret through the linguistic structures and patterns of the nusus is tawīl. For this reason, it is necessary to know conceptions of tawīl in order to accurately determine the hukm giving methods of fiqh schools. In this context, the thought of Zâhiri Ṭawīl, which is based on the zâhiri meaning of the words in the language and aims to solve the meaning pattern of the nusus within the framework of the rules of the language, is important. To this end, the tawīl understanding of Ibn Hazm (d. 543/1148), one of the leading ulama of Zâhiri thought, has an important position in the determination of their understanding of fiqh and usool. For this purpose, by searching the works of Ibn Hazm, how his understanding of tawīl, which he used as a method, is reflected in his fiqh thought, will be examined through his fiqhi inferences. The Qur’an used their language when addressing the societies. The Qur'an especially, on the one hand, has used the language they use to convey its messages to its interlocutors in a correct and understandable way, on the other hand, it has used a unique style without departing from the natural structure of the language in unseen matters due to the nature of religious language. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the words of the texts in order to understand and interpret the language used. The word tawīl was used by the ilm circles in the first period to mean the same as the word tafsir and in naming the works written as the Qur’an tafsir, the word tawīl was preferred instead of tafsir. Mâturîdî, the writer of the first dirayah tafsir, which points to the distinction between tafsir and tawīl, defines the word tafsir as 'to express exactly what is the meaning and purpose of the Qur'an, which is the divine word' and states that tafsir can be done only by the the Ṣaḥābah who knows Quran and Sunnah well. According to one of the many theses about the origin of language, it is God given. In other words, language has been taught to man by a supreme power (Allah). Ibn Hazm also defends this view. According to Ibn Hazm, the basic elements / elements of the language were taught by Allah to Adam (a.s), and then people developed this language in proportion to their needs. Therefore, the indications of the words depend on the declarations of God and linguistic experience. As a matter of fact, Allah has attributed new meanings to words such as salat, allegiance, hajj and similar words used for other meanings in the custom of language, and the new meanings attributed to them are accepted as the truth for the meanings of these words. Usûlists who adopted the method of fuqaha in usool, in the methods of istinbat of hukm out of sharii dalils, have generally made the taqseem of the words in terms of the meaning they were given to as âm, khâs, mushtarak and muavval while their taqsseem in terms of the words’ being used or not in the sense they were given was haqiqat, majaz, sarih and kinayah. Compared to other schools, the issue of tawīl has a different meaning according to the Zâhirî usûlists and faqih who base on the zâhiri khitab. Since the zâhir of the nusus is primary and essential, there should be a certain usool, principle and rule to give up the zâhir of the nusus and to switch to another possible meaning. Ibn Hazm states that there are different opinions among the usûlists about whether the imperative form is indicant of hukm. He also says that according to some Hanafi, Malikî and Shafii usûlists, as long as there is no evidence showing that it is wujub, tahrim, nedb, ibahâ and karahah, then the imperative form cannot be views as indicating a hukm. (shrink)

Satr al-awrah (Hijab /veiling) is one of the obligatory provisions for men and women in Islam. Satr al-awrah, as a religious/jurisprudential term, means covering the parts of the body (awrah) that should be covered by religion. Islamic jurisprudents have disagreed on whether satr al-awrah is a condition of validity for prayer. There are two basic approaches to this issue, one of which belongs to the public (jumhūr including the Hanafī, Shafiī and Hanbalī schools) and the other to the Mālikīs. According (...) to the majority (jumhūr), satr al-awrah is a validity condition of the prayer. Therefore, a prayer performed without fulfilling the satr al-awrah condition is not valid. A prayer performed in this way must be re-performed absolutely within or outside of time. There are two approaches in the Mālikī school regarding whether the satr al-awrah is a condition for the validity of the prayer. The first approach is (partly) the same as the jumhūr. According to the second approach (without any distinction between prayer and outside the prayer), satr al-awrah is a general obligation in Islam and is not a valid condition for prayer.According to the Mālikīs who accept this second view, it is sunnah to comply with the satr al-awrah condition in prayer. On the other hand, in the Mālikī school, awrah is divided into two as ʿawrah mughallaẓa and ʿawrah mukhaffafa in terms of its effect on the validity of prayer. The disagreement about whether the satr al-awrah is a condition of validity for the prayer is related to the ʿawrah mughallaẓa. On the other hand, there is an agreement that the ʿawrah mukhaffafa is not a condition for the validity of the prayer. The disagreement in the classical fiqh doctrine about whether the satr al-awrah is a condition for the validity of the prayer has some jurisprudential consequences. As a matter of fact, according to the majority, whether it is ʿawrah mughallaẓa or mukhaffafa, a prayer performed with an uncovered awrah is not valid and must be re-performed absolutely. In the Mālikī school, there are different opinions depending on whether it is ʿawrah mughallaẓa or mukhaffafa. If the place uncovered on the body is ʿawrah mughallaẓa; According to those who accept the satr al-awrah as a condition for the validity of the prayer, the prayer is not valid and must be re-performed absolutely. After the time has passed, the prayer does not have to be repeated. If the place uncovered on the body is ʿawrah mukhaffafa, according to all Mālikīs, unanimously the prayer is valid. Although it is recommended to reperformed it in time, it is not required to be returned after the time has passed. The following can be said about the practical examples of the disagreement in the classical fiqh doctrine regarding whether the satr al-awrah is a condition for the validity of the prayer, especially in terms of ʿawrah mukhaffafa: According to Mālikīs, who do not accept the validity of the satr al-awrah for prayer, it is valid for women to pray with their heads down, below the knees and with their arms uncovered. Again, according to them, it is valid for men to perform prayers with their thighs/hips (fakhz) uncovered, since it is considered one of the private parts. (shrink)